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In my dissertation, I experimentally examine whether and how the reporting 
model a firm uses to guide its corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures can 
influence managers’ capital allocation decisions. Chapter 1 provides an overview of my 
research question, why this research question is important, what I predict I will find, and 
the main results of my experiment. In Chapter 2, I briefly review the CSR literature 
generally and in accounting specifically, touching particularly on what has catalyzed the 
recent growth in CSR disclosure, how it influences behavior, and the emerging role of 
CSR reporting models as well as differences among these models. Two key features that 
differ among available reporting models are the intended users of the disclosures (e.g., 
capital providers or all stakeholders) and the disclosure location (e.g., MD&A or 
Sustainability Report). In Chapter 3, I draw upon research in social psychology on the 
social contingency model to hypothesize that differences in the intended users and the 
disclosure location jointly influence the extent to which managers’ capital allocations are 
weighted toward financial versus social benefits. I also hypothesize that this influence is 
mediated by how accountable managers feel for financial and social performance. 
Chapter 4 outlines the experimental design and method I use to test my hypotheses. The 
results of my experiment and related statistical analyses are reported in Chapters 5 and 6, 
in which I find support for my predictions across two different participant populations I 
use as proxies for managers. Specifically, I find that participants allocate capital to social 
benefits across all conditions, but that their overall allocations are largely driven by 
financial considerations. That is, they weight financial benefits more heavily than social 
xi 
 
benefits. However, when the reporting model disconnects CSR disclosure from a more 
traditional financial reporting setting (i.e., when the CSR disclosures are made to all 
stakeholders in a Sustainability Report), participants’ weight on financial benefits is 
reduced. In addition, I find that these results are driven by changes in perceived 
accountability for both financial and social performance. I also find evidence that the 
influence of the CSR disclosure location is contingent on whether the disclosure 
audience’s preferences are perceived to uniformly favor financial benefits. Chapter 7 
concludes and reiterates the important implications of my dissertation. Namely, the 
results of my study help inform standard setters, regulators, stakeholders, and managers 
about the consequences of alternative CSR reporting models and highlight the potential 










Traditionally, the manager’s role has largely focused on satisfying the interests of capital 
providers by maximizing profits. However, the recent emergence of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) as a mainstream practice is changing this perspective.1 That is, managers 
today are giving increased attention to the interests of a broader range of stakeholders whose 
interests may be relatively more attuned to firms’ social performance than their financial 
performance.2 In this setting, managers must often evaluate and make tradeoffs between the 
benefits and the beneficiaries of their capital allocations. For example, installing smokestack 
scrubbers can provide a social benefit to some stakeholders (e.g., local communities) by reducing 
air pollution, but the financial cost to install the scrubbers may negatively impact other 
stakeholders (e.g., shareholders). As managers evaluate this tradeoff between financial and social 
performance, their ultimate investment decision can be influenced by a variety of factors. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine one such factor that has yet to be examined in the CSR 
literature. Specifically, I examine whether and how the reporting model a firm uses to guide its 
CSR disclosures influences managers’ capital allocation decisions.  
CSR reporting models facilitate the CSR disclosure processes by helping managers 
identify relevant information to disclose and by providing a framework for how the disclosures 
                                                          
1 Consistent with Davis and Blomstrom (1966), Eilbert and Parket (1973), Fitch (1976), and Hales (2015), I define a 
CSR activity as an action taken by a business which either mitigates a negative externality or generates a positive 
externality. Externalities can be categorized based on their impact on society, the environment, etc. However, for 
ease of exposition, throughout this paper I characterize the impact of all externalities as benefits or costs to society. 
2 In line with Freeman (1984), I define a stakeholder as any group or individual who can influence or is influenced 
by the presence or operations of an organization. Stakeholders include investors, lenders, customers, communities, 
non-governmental organizations, etc.  
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can be prepared and presented. However, CSR disclosure is largely unregulated (Moser and 
Martin, 2012), and a number of reporting models have been created with important distinctions 
among them. Two of the key features that can be used to distinguish these models are the 
stakeholders the model identifies as the intended users of the disclosures (i.e., the disclosure 
“audience”) and the report that will serve as the primary disclosure outlet (i.e., the disclosure 
“location”). With respect to the disclosure audience, some models highlight capital providers as 
the audience. An advantage of this is that it allows managers’ to focus their disclosures on how 
CSR activities integrate with the firm’s economic objectives to create value over time. In 
contrast, other models expand the audience beyond capital providers to include other 
stakeholders such as communities, customers, etc., so that managers can meet the informational 
demands of all stakeholder groups.3 Similar considerations hold with respect to disclosure 
location. For instance, some models advocate integrating financial and CSR disclosures in a 
financial report (such as MD&A). Alternatively, other models support disclosing in a separate 
non-financial report (such as a Sustainability Report) which may better distinguish a firm’s 
social performance from its financial performance.4 In this paper, I use an experiment to 
investigate the implications of these two distinctions among CSR reporting models. More 
specifically, I investigate whether and how the disclosure audience and location specified by a 
CSR reporting model jointly influence managers’ capital allocation decisions. 
Examining this research question in an experimental setting offers many advantages. 
First, an experiment allows me to isolate and manipulate the disclosure audience and location 
                                                          
3 For ease of exposition, throughout the rest of the paper I refer to all stakeholders who are not capital providers 
(e.g., communities, customers, governments, non-governmental organizations, and suppliers) as “other 
stakeholders”. 
4 Different firms refer to the report in which they provide their CSR disclosures by different names. For instance, 
some refer to is as a Sustainability Report (e.g., BP and General Motors) while others refer to it as a CSR Report 
(e.g., Cisco and Sony). While some may use these terms interchangeably, throughout this paper and in my 
experiment, I use the term Sustainability Report.  
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while holding constant other extraneous factors suggested by prior research to influence 
managers’ capital allocations. These factors include stakeholder pressures, regulatory demands, 
labor market considerations, firm culture, and competition (for a review, see Kitzmueller and 
Shimshack, 2012). Second, in an experiment, I can measure and control for individual CSR 
preferences while reducing the effects of other individual differences by randomly assigning 
participants to experimental conditions. This is important as prior research suggests individual 
differences among managers, including managers’ CSR preferences, have a significant influence 
on firms’ investments (Agle et al. 1999; Reinhardt et al., 2008; Chin et al., 2013; Parker, 2014). 
Third, an experiment enables me to mimic an internal decision-making setting for which 
empirical data is generally not available. In other words, an experiment offers a controlled 
glimpse into an otherwise empirical “black box”. Finally, determining a causal relation between 
a reporting model and managers’ decisions with archival data, if it is available, suffers from 
endogeneity because firms can generally choose which CSR reporting model they want to 
follow. I overcome this issue in my experiment by exogenously imposing a reporting model to 
get at this causal relation and can therefore speak to policy implications in the event that 
regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, endorse or mandate a specific 
reporting model.5 
The social contingency model of judgment and choice (Tetlock, 1985, 1992) provides a 
theoretical basis for predicting how managers’ capital allocations will be jointly influenced by a 
                                                          
5 I also believe my experiment generalizes to present-day settings for at least two reasons. First, the endogenous 
choice of a CSR reporting model is likely to be sticky, at least in the short run, so long as switching costs are high 
(Graham et al., 2005). In this case, the reporting model is effectively exogenous from one period to the next. Second, 
capital allocations pertaining to CSR are made at different levels within a firm, as is the case with firms like Hyatt 
Regency who decentralize and delegate CSR investment decisions to local and regional managers. In such 
situations, even if the CSR reporting model is viewed as being endogenous at the firm level, it would likely be 
exogenous at all lower levels. My research design, therefore, allows me to address not only regulatory policy 
implications, but also practical implications of individual firm adoption of a reporting model. 
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disclosure’s audience and location. This model is grounded in the social psychology literature 
(Greenwald, 1980; Baumeister, 1982; Chaiken and Trope, 1999) and has been supported by 
studies in both psychology (Tetlock 1983; Tetlock et al., 1989) and accounting (Peecher, 1996; 
Hoffman and Patton, 1997; Dezoort et al., 2006; Gaynor et al., 2006). The social contingency 
model suggests that, when managers are accountable to a salient stakeholder audience, the 
perceived preference of the audience will factor heavily in managers’ decisions for at least two 
reasons. The first is that managers are motivated to protect and improve their social status and 
image (Greenwald, 1980; Baumeister, 1982). One way managers can do this is by making 
decisions that are at least defensible to their audience, but that would ideally gain their 
audience’s approval. The second is because conforming to the audience’s preference reduces the 
cognitive effort managers’ are required to exert to make the decision (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; 
Chaiken and Trope, 1999). 
Drawing on the social contingency model, I propose that the perceived preference of the 
CSR disclosure audience will influence managers’ capital allocations. Specifically, I expect 
managers directing their disclosures to a capital-provider audience will anticipate that capital 
providers will tend to prefer financial benefits over social benefits. Managers will therefore feel 
relatively more accountable for financial performance than social performance. As a result, they 
will increase their investment in projects that maximize financial benefits because doing so is a 
cognitively easy way of making a decision that is likely to gain the approval of capital providers. 
However, when managers consider the conflicting preferences for financial and social benefits of 
a stakeholder audience that includes capital providers and other stakeholders (“all stakeholders”), 
the audience-preferred investment is less clear. In this situation, I expect that managers will be 
more likely to consider additional information such as the disclosure location to help identify a 
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defensible decision. Consequently, when disclosing CSR information to all stakeholders in a 
financial report, I expect managers’ will feel relatively more accountable for financial 
performance than social performance and increase their investments in projects that are expected 
to generate higher financial returns. Conversely, when disclosing CSR information to all 
stakeholders in a non-financial report, I expect managers’ will feel relatively more accountable 
for social performance than financial performance and increase their investments in projects that 
are expected to generate more social benefits. 
I test my predictions using a 2x2 between-participants experiment by manipulating 
disclosure audience (capital providers vs. all stakeholders) and disclosure location (MD&A vs. 
Sustainability Report). I use participants in a MBA class as proxies for CEO’s of a public 
company. Their primary task in my experiment is to evaluate two potential projects (A and B) 
and allocate a fixed amount of capital between them. Both projects produce a positive financial 
benefit to the firm and a positive social benefit, but they differ in one important way. Namely, 
project A exceeds the company’s financial hurdle rate but falls short of the firm’s social goal 
while project B falls short of the company’s financial hurdle rate but exceeds the firm’s social 
goal. Therefore, this design enables me to analyze whether and how the weights participants 
place on financial and social benefits change based on the CSR disclosure audience and location 
when a firm’s financial and social goals conflict. 
The results of my experiment suggest that the CSR reporting model a firm uses does 
affect managers capital allocations and that this effect is driven by how accountable managers 
feel for financial and social performance. Specifically, when the reporting model links CSR 
disclosure with financial objectives (i.e., when CSR disclosure is directed to only capital 
providers and/or is provided in MD&A), participants allocate more capital to the project that 
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maximizes financial benefits rather than social benefits because they feel relatively more 
accountable for financial performance compared to social performance. However, when the 
reporting model disconnects CSR disclosure from a traditional financial reporting setting (i.e., 
when CSR disclosure is directed to all stakeholders in a Sustainability Report), the difference 
between how accountable participants feel for financial and social performance is mitigated as is 
the difference in their capital allocations to projects that emphasize financial and social benefits.  
I also find support for the theory underlying the social contingency model. As predicted 
by the model, I find evidence that the influence of the CSR disclosure location is contingent on 
the preferences of the disclosure audience. When the intended audience was perceived to have a 
largely uniform preference for financial returns over social benefits, manager participants 
indicated that their capital allocations were more influenced by the disclosure audience than the 
location of the disclosures. However, when the intended audience was perceived to have diverse 
preferences for financial vs. social investments, participants indicated that their allocations were 
more influenced by where the disclosures would be reported rather than who the disclosures 
were addressed to.  
At a broad level, this research speaks to how reporting models that guide firms’ CSR 
disclosure can have real effects on firm behavior. That is, rather than being merely a medium for 
external reporting, accounting disclosure can also affect managers’ internal decision-making. 
Given the billions of dollars firms collectively spend on CSR-related activities annually, my 
study suggests that a CSR reporting model can have real economic consequences for firms and 
stakeholders.6 Specifically, by shifting the weights managers place on financial and social 
                                                          
6 Smith (2014) estimates that global corporate spending on philanthropic activities exceeds fifteen billion dollars 
annually. Importantly, this figure can be viewed as a floor for actual CSR-related spending because it does not 
include spending that provides any financial benefit to the corporation.  
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benefits, a CSR reporting model can alter both the benefits and beneficiaries of managers’ capital 
allocations. Therefore, this study should be of practical interest to both managers and 
stakeholders.  
Understanding how different reporting models influence managers’ capital allocations 
has implications for current and future practice. Recently, there has been a surge in public 
concern about social issues, and this surge has spurred a greater demand for CSR disclosure 
(Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). In response to this demand, a growing number of regulators and 
stock exchanges are instituting mandatory CSR disclosure requirements (KPMG et al., 2013; 
European Union, 2014). In addition, in the absence of comprehensive CSR disclosure guidance 
from regulators, standard setters are creating reporting models for firms to use to guide their CSR 
disclosure (KPMG et al., 2013). These developments have resulted in a great deal of variation in 
CSR disclosure. While standard setters and regulators are expressing a desire to harmonize these 
varying models and requirements (KPMG et al., 2013), there is a surprising paucity of research 
on the implications of existing divergent disclosure practices to inform both the harmonization 
process (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Hales, 2015) and managers about their CSR reporting 
model decisions. This paper helps to fill this void by providing evidence about how disclosure 
audience and location, two key differences among reporting models, affect managers’ capital 
allocation decisions.  
One specific implication of this research is that disclosure audience and location do not 
completely eliminate managers’ investment in either financial or social benefits, but can tilt the 
balance of benefits in favor of one over the other. To the extent regulators seek to use CSR 
disclosure as a mechanism to influence corporate investment, this study should be informative. 
For instance, if regulators want to maximize the benefits to society derived by corporate 
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investments, they may want to consider instituting or endorsing a reporting model in which CSR 
disclosures are made in a report separate from existing financial disclosures and are not directed 
to an exclusive capital-provider audience.  
This study contributes to the growing CSR literature. Among other things, prior studies 
on the determinants of CSR investment have examined whether firms seek to use CSR as a way 
to attract employees, cut costs, differentiate from competitors, attract customers, improve 
financial performance, and signal future financial performance (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 
2012; Lys et al., 2014). Prior studies have also looked at social activism (Davidson et al., 1995; 
Klein et al., 2004; Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012) and firm ethicality (Kim et al., 2012; Hoi 
et al., 2013) as determinants of CSR investment levels. My study adds to this literature by 
introducing CSR disclosure as a determinant of the allocation of benefits derived from CSR 
investment. In doing so, I answer the call for additional accounting research on the consequences 
of CSR disclosure (Moser and Martin, 2012). 
My results also help build a theoretical understanding of how CSR reporting models 
influence managers’ decisions. I provide evidence that CSR reporting models influence how 
accountable managers feel for financial and social performance which affects their subsequent 
decisions. I also find that the effect of disclosure location on managers’ decisions depends on the 
preferences of the disclosure audience. This finding suggest that when firms, standard setters, 
and regulators evaluate alternative reporting models, they should perhaps first consider which 
disclosure audience they would like to prioritize and make disclosure location a secondary 
consideration. In addition to informing firms, standard setters, and regulators, this study should 
also be of interest to academics conducting CSR research in a managerial context as it increases 




BACKGROUND & LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 CSR, Externalities, and Stakeholders 
Corporate social responsibility, or CSR, is not a well-defined term and there is little 
agreement about what the definition should be (Carroll, 1999; Freeman and Hasnaoui, 2011). In 
fact, some argue that it simply cannot be defined because it is a concept that has been socially 
created (Dahlsrud, 2008) and is dependent on contextual factors that differ across societies and 
nations (Gjolberg, 2009). Despite these challenges, many CSR definitions have been proposed. 
Among these, there seems to be general agreement that, foundationally, CSR consists of 
corporate actions that advance social (including environmental) interests.  
Some definitions, however, layer additional stipulations on to this foundation (see 
Carroll, 1999, and Freeman and Hasnaoui, 2011). For example, some definitions require that, to 
be considered CSR, corporate actions cannot be motivated by financial profits (e.g., Manne and 
Wallich, 1972; Baron, 2001) and must even be costly to the firm (e.g., Manne and Wallich, 1972; 
Reinhardt et al., 2008; Benabou and Tirole, 2010), implying that CSR is wholly altruistic. In 
contrast, other definitions proposed by both academics (e.g., Davis, 1960; Johnson, 1971; 
Carroll, 1979; Drucker, 1984; Jensen, 2001; Hales, 2015) and institutions (e.g., the World Bank, 
the United Nations, and the European Commission) make room for corporate profits.7 That is, 
these definitions acknowledge profitability and economic viability as a form of social 
                                                          






responsibility (Carroll, 1979), that corporate actions to address societal issues can be seen as 
opportunities for profitable innovation (Drucker, 1984), and that CSR can be value-enhancing in 
the long-term (Davis, 1960; Johnson, 1971; Jensen, 2001). A second stipulation some definitions 
make is that, to be considered CSR, corporate actions must go beyond the firm’s current 
economic and legal requirements (e.g., McGuire, 1963; Walton, 1967; Manne and Wallich, 
1972; Davis, 1973; Sethi, 1975; Carroll, 1979; Jones, 1980; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; 
Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). According to this stipulation, despite the social or 
environmental good that may be produced by corporate actions, these actions do not constitute 
CSR unless they go above and beyond what the firm is required to do.  
For the purposes of this paper, I follow an approach similar to Davis and Blomstrom 
(1966), Eilbert and Parket (1973), Fitch (1976), and Hales (2015) and remain silent as to firm 
motives and obligations, defining CSR more generally as any action taken by a corporation that 
benefits society by mitigating a negative externality or generating a positive externality. In doing 
so, I acknowledge the broad spectrum of potential CSR activities that this definition allows and 
that some actions can be more socially responsible than others (i.e., they do more good for 
society than others). Nevertheless, I consider CSR as a corporate action that provides benefits to 
society in the form of a positive externality and/or a reduction of an existing negative 
externality.8  
Consistent with Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962), I define an externality as either a 
benefit received or a cost borne by stakeholders who did not choose to receive that benefit or 
incur that cost. A negative externality is one that imposes a cost on stakeholders. For example, a 
                                                          
8 Regarding negative externalities, this definition is not intended to limit CSR for a company to only reducing the 
negative externalities it is responsible for creating. Rather, CSR can include reducing negative externalities created 
by other entities as well. 
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factory that releases pollution into the atmosphere creates a negative externality for local 
communities who must now bear the medical costs and other costs associated with lower air 
quality. In contrast, when an externality creates a benefit for stakeholders, it is a positive 
externality. For example, a company that builds a new factory creates jobs and tax revenues for 
local communities and may invest in local infrastructure to the benefit of the community as well 
as the company. There are many different kinds of positive and negative externalities that 
companies can create, and these can arise from a host of issues pertaining to, for example, 
community relations, corporate governance, supply chain management, product safety, waste 
generation, resource consumption, employee relations, human rights, globalization, climate 
change, and environmental management. 
Externalities can impact a variety of different types of stakeholders. By stakeholders, I 
mean any group or individual who can influence or is influenced by the presence or operations of 
an organization (Freeman, 1984). Individual stakeholders are commonly categorized into broader 
stakeholder groups, including capital providers (i.e., shareholders and lenders), customers, 
governments, employees, communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and suppliers. 
As implied by the definition, each of these stakeholder groups is affected by corporations, has 
the ability to influence corporations, or both.  
2.2 The Growth of CSR  
Even though the practice of CSR has only recently become broadly popular, it is not a 
modern concept. Rather, it has been discussed, researched, and practiced for centuries (Carroll, 
1999). While there are many potential explanations for the recent emergence of CSR, I will 
elaborate on five in the sections that follow. These explanations include the theoretical and 
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empirical link between CSR and firm value, ethics, the corporate legal environment, the CSR 
disclosure landscape, and capital provider demand.  
2.2.1 CSR and Firm Value 
One explanation for the growth in CSR practices is the theoretical and empirical 
connection between CSR and the economic performance of the firm which has helped align 
managers’, shareholders’, and society’s interests (Lee, 2008). Collectively, CSR research since 
the 1990’s helps identify why CSR can be in the interests of both the firm and its stakeholders 
because, in addition to benefiting society, it can boost firm value by increasing revenues, 
decreasing costs, and mitigating risks. 
 An area that has received a great deal of attention from researchers is how CSR affects 
the labor market. From a hiring perspective, CSR acts as a signal to potential employees of the 
values and culture within a firm (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Balakrishnan et al., 2011). As 
such, CSR can reduce information asymmetry and decrease firm costs associated with finding 
prospective employees that will function well within a company’s culture (Brekke and Nyborg, 
2004). However, not only can CSR help create better employee–employer matches, but it can 
also help firms gain a competitive advantage over competitors because a CSR firm appears more 
attractive to job applicants (Turban and Greening, 1997; Backhaus et al., 2002). Specifically, 
CSR can send a positive signal about the attractiveness of a firm as an employer and increases 
the probability that job applicants will pursue and accept a job from a CSR firm compared to a 
non-CSR firm (Greening and Turban, 2000). 
 Other labor market advantages CSR firms have pertain to existing employees and are 
related to employee commitment, effort, and compensation. Peterson (2004) provides survey 
evidence that the perceived ethics of CSR strengthens the commitment between the employee 
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and employer, even more so than financial remuneration. In an accounting experiment, 
Balakrishnan et al. (2011) report that CSR (in the form of corporate donations to charity) 
motivates employees to altruistically increase their effort levels for the firm, despite the fact that 
corporate donations reduce the firm resources available for employee consumption. Thus, it 
appears that CSR can reduce the indirect labor cost to firms associated with monitoring 
employee effort. Furthermore, there is theoretical support for the notion that employers may be 
able to pass along some of the cost of CSR to employees in the form of lower wages when 
employees have preferences for CSR (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012).  There are also other 
potential indirect benefits to firms’ CSR efforts. Consider the example of the firm that gives its 
employees paid time off to work on socially beneficial projects in the local community. 
Employee participation in these kinds of volunteer programs can pay long-term dividends to 
companies in the form of employee skill development in areas such as leadership skills and 
strategic vision (Needleman, 2008). 
 In addition to labor market benefits, consumer reactions to CSR can also directly bolster 
a firm’s market value (Lev et al., 2006). For instance, CSR can help firms differentiate their 
products and services from their competitors (Navarro, 1988; Sprinkle and Maines, 2010) and 
can enhance customer loyalty (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Bhattacharya and Sen 2003), both of 
which can potentially increase top-line revenues. There is also evidence that, not only can CSR 
make some products and services more attractive, but also that some consumers are willing to 
pay a premium for these outputs.9 For example, surveyed coffee consumers state they are willing 
to pay a premium for sustainably-sourced coffee relative to coffee from less sustainable sources 
                                                          
9 However, as Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) note, it is also possible consumers’ willingness to pay a premium, 
as documented in studies that provide survey evidence, may be driven by a subset of consumers with strong 
preferences for CSR. 
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(Loureiro and Lotade, 2005). Similarly, many consumers pay a premium cost for “green” energy 
from sustainable sources (Roe et al. 2001) and higher rents for office spaces in sustainable 
buildings (Eichholtz et al., 2010).  
  Another value-relevant benefit of CSR is that it can help companies identify and mitigate 
potential long-term risks. From a risk-management perspective, there is empirical evidence that 
firms can use CSR to figuratively purchase goodwill from stakeholders to insulate them from 
value-destroying stakeholder reactions to negative firm events (Richardson et al., 1999). In this 
sense, CSR can act as an insurance policy to prevent the loss of firm value. However, only 
certain forms of CSR appear to be effective at purchasing this type of stakeholder goodwill. 
Specifically, CSR activities that benefit society rather than capital providers seem to be effective 
insurance policies against future negative stakeholder reactions (Godfrey et al., 2009).10  
 CSR can also theoretically help firms manage risks pertaining to stakeholder activism 
(Baron, 2001; Baron and Diermeier, 2007). For an activist intervention to be effective, activists 
rely a great deal on the court of public opinion. By engaging in CSR, firms can enhance their 
social image and make themselves a more challenging and costly target of activist attention 
relative to their competitors, thereby reducing the likelihood of an intervention. Stakeholder 
activism is not uncommon and can be concerning for corporations (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 
2012). It is quite costly and often results in economically significant stock price declines among 
targeted companies (Pruitt and Friedman, 1986; Pruitt et al., 1988; Davidson et al., 1995). Thus, 
                                                          
10 Looking at empirical data, Godfrey et al. (2009) find that CSR that influences secondary stakeholders function 
like an insurance policy against negative stakeholder reactions to negative firm events but that CSR that influences 
primary stakeholders does not. Following Freeman et al. (2008), Godfrey et al. (2009, p. 429) identify primary 
stakeholders as those who are “essential to the operations to the business” and who “can make legitimate claims on 
the firm and its managers and have both urgency and power…to enforce those claims” while secondary stakeholders 
are those who “can influence primary stakeholders” and have “legitimate claims on the firm, but lack both urgency 
and power to enforce those claims.” 
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it isn’t surprising that companies often take actions (both preemptive and reactive) to mitigate 
these risks (Davidson et al., 1995; Eesley and Lenox, 2006). 
Another risk that voluntary CSR can help companies mitigate pertains to regulatory 
intervention. For instance, a company can voluntarily reduce its carbon emissions in an effort to 
avoid mandatory carbon-reducing regulations that may be more costly and stringent. Regulatory 
intervention can be more costly than stakeholder activism on firm behavior (Khanna and Anton, 
2002; Delmas and Toffel, 2008), and there is evidence to suggest that preemptive corporate 
actions that involve CSR can effectively mitigate regulatory intervention (Bandyopadhyay and 
Horowitz, 2006; Shimshack and Ward, 2008). In fact, pre-emptive CSR can even produce 
positive subsequent benefits for companies such as less future oversight by regulators (Innes and 
Sam, 2008) and faster regulatory approval times (Decker, 2003).  
Beyond risk management, CSR has helped some firms identify opportunities to innovate 
which can create both operational efficiencies and revenue growth. One example of innovative 
CSR is provided by the waste management practices of Procter & Gamble. Motivated by CSR, 
Procter & Gamble found it can reduce the waste created by its manufacturing processes by 
converting it into raw materials and selling it to other companies. In this way, CSR has helped 
Procter & Gamble to both reduce its waste and increase its revenues. In fact, Procter & Gamble 
reports that seven years of this innovative practice has generated $1.6 billion in “value” for the 
company.11  
While there are many ways for firms to potentially benefit from engaging in CSR 
activities, rigorous empirical evidence on the relationship between CSR and firm value is far 
                                                          
11 See http://www.pg.com/en_US/sustainability/environmental_sustainability/worth_from_waste.shtml.  
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from conclusive. A large number of studies have attempted to examine this issue. In a meta-
analysis of 251 of these studies, Margolis et al. (2009) report only a very modest positive 
correlation between CSR and corporate financial performance. Specifically, 28% of the studies 
they examined report a positive correlation, 2% report a negative correlation, 59% report no 
correlation, and 10% do not report statistical results. Additionally, Margolis et al. (2009) declare 
that the driving factor behind the overall positive correlation is indeterminable. That is, it could 
just as easily be that positive financial performance drives CSR and not the reverse. This 
interpretation is consistent with Lys et al. (2014) who report that strong financial performance 
leads to greater subsequent CSR activity. They therefore conclude that CSR disclosure is a 
management signal of strong future company performance. 
Recently, Eccles et al. (2014) attempted to address the issue of causality in their study by 
observing a long lag period between the independent and dependent variables of CSR 
performance and firm value, respectively. However, rather than just look at CSR performance 
levels generally, Eccles et al. (2014) differentiated between firms that integrated CSR into their 
institutional processes and strategies (high CSR companies) and those that did not (low CSR 
companies). They then match-paired 90 high-CSR companies with 90 similar low-CSR 
companies and compared the stock market and accounting performance of these pairs over an 
18-year span. Eccles et al. (2014) report that high-CSR companies significantly outperformed 
low-CSR companies in terms of both stock market returns and accounting performance. In a 
similar vein, Khan et al. (2015) and Cheng et al. (2015) provide evidence about how strategic 
investment in CSR projects that 1) are relevant to both corporations and stakeholders and 2) are 
relatively more likely to be impactful (i.e., material) to the corporation perform in the stock 
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market.12 Khan et al. (2015) found that companies who strategically directed capital to material 
CSR projects and diverted capital from immaterial CSR projects performed the best, suggesting 
that CSR materiality is an additional moderator between CSR and firm performance. 
Interestingly, however, they also find that firms who invested in immaterial CSR projects 
performed similarly to firms who did not invest at all, suggesting that, at a minimum, even 
investment in immaterial CSR projects may not destroy firm value. Thus, to the extent research 
finds a strong positive correlation between CSR and financial performance, it could indicate that 
managers are strategically picking which CSR projects they believe will be financially beneficial 
(Reinhardt et al., 2008). Notwithstanding this evidence, the issue of reverse causality remains, 
such that it is unclear whether CSR investments provide positive firm benefits, on average, or 
whether managers of financially successful firms are more likely to engage in CSR activities. 
2.2.2 The Ethical Case for CSR 
A second explanation for the increased presence of CSR is that it is widely seen as the 
right thing to do and part of being a good corporate citizen. Given that most of the CSR activities 
that companies engage in are voluntary, this explanation for CSR has been characterized by 
some as altruism (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Sprinkle and Maines, 2010). Altruism aligns well 
with the view of many of the early CSR theorists that were discussed above who define CSR as a 
company’s “obligation” (Bowen, 1953; Davis and Blomstrom, 1966; Jones, 1980) or 
“responsibility” (Steiner, 1971; Carroll, 1979).  
                                                          
12 The materiality construct used by Khan et al. (2015) is based on the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board’s 
(SASB) concept of materiality. To identify material CSR activities within each industry, the SASB has been 
working with and identifying topics that are of interest to corporations, capital providers, and other stakeholders. 
They then collect information about the level of interest in each of the CSR activities, and the potential of these 
activities to affect corporate financial performance and future corporate performance.  
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It is challenging to disentangle profit-motives from altruistic motives for CSR, but there 
is evidence that altruism drives at least some of the CSR activities companies engage in. Sprinkle 
and Maines (2010) provide specific examples of CSR which are unlikely to be explained by 
profit motives. They point out that Merck has donated billions of medicinal tablets in an effort to 
fight river blindness in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East with little to no direct benefit 
to themselves. They also point to evidence that many companies have anonymously provided 
disaster relief donations and supplies to help alleviate suffering and rebuild communities affected 
by natural disasters. As further evidence of the existence of altruistic motives, 58% of managers 
at the largest 250 revenue-generating firms in the world reported that ethical considerations 
motivate their CSR activities (KPMG, 2011). In fact, the frequency of the survey responses 
about ethical considerations was second only to reputation concerns.  
2.2.3 The Legal Case for CSR 
A third explanation for CSR practices among firms in the U.S. pertains to the legal 
environment, which has changed over time. In the U.S., managers’ overarching legal 
responsibilities to shareholders can be summarized by their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. 
To fulfill the duty of loyalty, managers must act in the best interests of the corporation in good 
faith (Strine et al., 2010). The duty of care requires managers to “exercise that degree of skill, 
diligence, and care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances” 
(Clark, 1986, p. 123). If managers violate these two duties they open themselves up to personal 
liability.  
Through the first half of the 20th century, managers’ fiduciary duty was limited to the 
shareholder view of corporate assets, which is that managers’ actions must be in the 
shareholders’ best interests (Fry et al., 1982). This view restricted managers’ ability to engage in 
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CSR with respect to practices like making charitable donations because they were not perceived 
to be in shareholders’ best interests. However, this largely changed as a result of a 1954 New 
Jersey Supreme Court ruling that abandoned the shareholder view. That is, the ruling opened the 
door for corporations to make charitable donations “without regard to any strict relation to 
stockholders’ interests” (Fry et al., 1982, p. 95). Since then, all 50 states have adopted similar 
positions and recognize that corporations have a right to donate corporate assets to charity 
(Reinhardt et al., 2008). 
The New Jersey Supreme court ruling was pivotal in paving the way for subsequent CSR 
practices. Since that ruling, the courts have largely deferred to managers’ judgment of what is in 
the best interests of the corporation when it comes to CSR activities like charitable donations. 
This judicial practice, known as the business judgment rule, largely presumes that managers are 
better able to discern what is in the best interests of the company than are the courts. As a result, 
judges grant managers a great deal of latitude when it comes to CSR—even in extreme cases 
(Branson, 2002). One notorious example of just how far the courts’ deference to managers’ 
judgment goes is a case tried in Delaware in 1989. The then CEO of Occidental Petroleum, 
Armand Hammer, had donated $120 million of Occidental’s assets for the construction of an art 
museum to be named after him. This amount was equivalent to almost one-half of the company’s 
annual net profits. Based on the business judgment rule, the court refused to intervene on behalf 
of the shareholder plaintiffs (Reinhardt et al., 2008). In spite of this extreme example, however, 
protection from the business judgment rule is not limitless and requires that, when challenged, 
managers be able to make a plausible argument that their decisions and actions were made in 
good faith and are in the best long-term interests of the firm.  
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Given the recent research discussed above that positively links CSR to long-term firm 
value—or at a minimum, the absence of financial harm—there is likely to be an even stronger 
legal case for CSR today than in the past. Notwithstanding being on solid legal footing, some 
companies (like The New York Times) who wish to engage in CSR have taken the additional 
steps of placing provisions in their corporate charters to authorize themselves to use company 
assets for CSR activities (Reinhardt et al., 2008). Another option for businesses that wish to 
engage in CSR is to incorporate as a benefit corporation (B-corp). The specific purpose of a B-
corp is to positively and materially impact society and, as a result, B-corp status offers explicit 
protections for companies to engage in CSR. Specifically, B-corp law expands the duties of 
managers to include both financial and non-financial stakeholders and therefore requires 
managers to report on their company’s CSR activities (Clark Jr. et al., 2013). Currently, there are 
over 1,200 B-corps worldwide, including recognizable companies such as Ben & Jerry’s Ice 
Cream, Etsy, and Patagonia.13 
2.2.4 CSR Disclosure Requirements 
A growing number of regulators and standard setters are instituting mandatory CSR 
disclosure requirements. To illustrate, in 2014 the European Union issued a directive which will 
require approximately 6,000 companies based in European Union member states to disclose 
specific environmental, social, and governance information, beginning in 2017 (European Union, 
2014).14 As further evidence, in a non-exhaustive sampling of current national CSR disclosure 
guidelines, KPMG et al. (2013) identify 134 mandatory disclosure requirements across 42 
                                                          
13 B-corps are currently legal in 27 states (and the District of Columbia). Legislation to establish B-corps has been 
introduced in 12 additional states. Further information about B-corps is available at https://www.bcorporation.net/.  
14 This European Union directive pertains only to companies with more than 500 employees. While it outlines 
specific information to disclose, it gives each company the flexibility to select which CSR reporting model it wishes 
to use.  
21 
 
nations.15 For example, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act passed by the U. S. Congress in 2010 requires certain firms to report on the 
measures they are taking to determine whether conflict minerals are entering their supply chain. 
KPMG et al. (2013) also identify 13 nations—including China, India, Russia, Brazil, and 
France—where more extensive CSR disclosure is required for state-owned businesses. Stock 
exchanges are also getting involved by mandating CSR disclosure as a listing requirement and by 
providing CSR disclosure guidance for its listed companies. According to the Sustainable Stock 
Exchanges Initiative, at least five stock exchanges currently require some form of CSR 
disclosure to be listed (the Johannesburg, Shanghai, Malaysian, London, and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges), while nineteen exchanges encourage CSR disclosure and provide formal guidance 
on what CSR information to disclose (SSE, 2012).   
Based on the notion that what gets measured gets managed, the CSR disclosure 
requirements imposed by regulators, standard setters, and stock exchanges provide a fourth 
explanation for the recent expansion of CSR practices. In other words, as the CSR disclosure 
requirements have increased over time, firms are likely averse to disclosing unfavorable 
information about their CSR performance. As a result, firms who were previously poor CSR 
performers likely increased their CSR activity to avoid potential negative shocks to their public 
image. 
2.2.5 Capital Provider Demand for CSR Disclosure 
 In addition to the requirements imposed by regulators, standard setters, and stock 
exchanges, a fifth explanation for the growth of CSR is that an increasing number of capital 
providers are demanding that firms be sustainable and provide information about their CSR 
                                                          
15 Given the casual nature of this survey by KPMG et al. (2013), this figure could be seen as the lower bound for the 
number of mandatory CSR disclosure requirements that actually exist in these 42 nations. 
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practices. This demand is evidenced in a number of ways. For instance, US SIF (2014) reports 
that since 2012, the inclusion of CSR performance in investors’ investment criteria has increased 
76% and that almost 1 in 5 dollars invested in managed funds in the U.S. is invested based on 
this criteria. As further evidence, Johnson (2015) reports that in 2014, 47% of all proxy proposals 
were related to CSR issues (including political lobbying), which was up from 37% in 2013. In 
addition, the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC) surveyed its 
stakeholders in 2013 to learn what projects they would like the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) to prioritize. FASAC (2013) reports that, while CSR disclosure did not make the 
top ten priorities overall, it was listed by a number of stakeholders and was even listed as a top-
five priority by some.16   
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) provide further evidence of investors’ demand for (and use of) 
CSR information. In their study, Dhaliwal et al. found that, conditional on company CSR 
performance being strong, investors incorporated CSR information into their investment 
decisions and rewarded disclosing companies by requiring a lower rate of return on their capital. 
Thus, companies who perform better than their peers with respect to CSR and disclose CSR 
information may enjoy a reduced cost of equity capital. Further, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012) also provide evidence that analysts use CSR disclosure to make decisions 
and that it can reduce analysts’ forecast errors. Similarly, Matsumura et al. (2014) provide 
evidence that the market prices firms’ carbon emission disclosures and has punished firms who 
emit by an average of over $200,000 per every 1,000 metric tons of carbon. Furthermore, they 
                                                          
16 One of the roles of the FASAC is to “advise the [FASB] on future project priorities and on possible new agenda 
items” (FASAC, 2013, p. 3). The FASAC stakeholders surveyed include “31 current FASAC members, 13 current 
members from other FASB advisory groups (including members of the Not-for-Profit, Investor, and Small Business 
Advisory Committees and the Private Company Council), 6 FASB Board members, and 55 other stakeholders” 
(FASC, 2013, p. 3) whose backgrounds include accounting practitioners, business managers, academics, 
shareholders, and lenders. 
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also report that firms who did not report this information were punished relative to firms who 
disclosed.17 So in summary, there seems to be growing evidence that shareholders are demanding 
firms engage in CSR and provide information about their CSR performance, and that 
shareholders put a value on this information and factor it into their investment decisions. 
2.3 CSR in the Accounting Literature 
Coinciding with the popularization of CSR disclosure, attention to CSR research has 
increased in accounting academia. Because accounting research particularly focuses on issues 
pertaining to things like employee contracting and shareholder reaction to firm disclosure, it 
offers unique insights and makes important contributions to the overall CSR literature. In the two 
sections that follow, I briefly discuss and summarize some of these more recent contributions. 
2.3.1 How CSR Influences Internal Firm Behavior 
 One theory about CSR from the management literature suggests that CSR activities 
provide managers with political and social capital that can help insulate managers against 
negative events (Godfrey et al., 2009). If true, this has important implications because it suggests 
that as managers participate in CSR activities they may feel shielded from negative repercussions 
stemming from other actions they take. Therefore, they may feel more licensed to engage in 
opportunistic behavior that benefits themselves at the expense of other stakeholders. This theory 
suggests a positive association between the level of engagement in CSR and various forms of 
unscrupulous behavior within the same firm. However, as I will illustrate below, a number of 
accounting studies have found the opposite to be the case.  
                                                          
17 Other accounting studies provide evidence that the market finds CSR disclosures informative. Specifically, 
Anderson and Frankle (1980), Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), Griffin and Sun (2013), and Plumlee et al. (2015) report 
finding a positive link between a firm’s CSR disclosures and its stock returns.  
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Gao et al. (2014) investigated the relation between CSR and insider trading and report 
that as CSR activity increased insider trading decreased. Furthermore, they found that this 
negative relationship grew stronger among managers who were publically associated with the 
firm’s CSR image and also among managers whose compensation was more closely tied to firm 
value. So in contrast to the theory cited above that would suggest a positive relation between 
CSR and insider trading, these findings are consistent with the idea that CSR makes managers 
more sensitive and aversive to engaging in activities that can damage the reputational and 
economic capital they gain from their association with CSR. That is, CSR may make negative 
activities like insider trading appear more costly rather than less costly to managers. Importantly, 
in addition to finding evidence of an economic explanation for their results, Gao et al. (2014) 
also provide evidence that individual manager preferences strengthened the negative correlation 
they detected between insider trading and CSR and that this behavior was not attributable to 
corporate governance. Thus, there appears to be both economic and personal motives at work 
driving the negative association between CSR and insider trading. This personal motive is 
consistent with Martin and Moser (2014) who report that managers in an experimental market 
exhibited utility for CSR and were willing to bear a cost to facilitate it.  
Likewise, multiple accounting studies provide evidence that CSR activity is negatively 
correlated with another specific kind of behavior which can be construed as devious: aggressive 
tax practices (Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Hoi et al., 2013). However, evidence from Watson 
(2015) suggests that this behavior is moderated by the firm’s financial performance. That is, 
Watson (2015) found that when firms performed well financially, firms who tended to be more 
socially responsible took less aggressive tax positions, but when these firms performed poorly 
financially there was no difference between their tax aggressiveness and that of firms who were 
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less socially responsible. In a similar vein, Kim et al. (2012) report that, in their sample, the level 
of CSR activity was negatively associated with real and accrual earnings management as well as 
SEC investigations. However, this isn’t to say that managers of CSR firms don’t manage 
earnings. A recent working paper by Barton et al. (2014) explores the motives of managers at 
CSR firms compared to non-CSR firms for managing earnings. They found that CSR managers 
were more likely to do so when it benefitted external stakeholders (i.e., shareholders) but not 
when it benefitted themselves. In other words, CSR managers do manage earnings, but it is 
apparently not motivated solely by individual opportunism. 
2.3.2 CSR Disclosure and its Influence on Capital Providers 
To illustrate the exponential growth of voluntary CSR disclosure over the last two 
decades, KPMG (2013) reports the results of a survey of the largest 250 revenue generating firms 
in the world, and the 100 largest revenue generating firms in each of 41 different countries. The 
survey reveals that 93% (71%) of the world’s largest 250 (4,100) firms currently disclose CSR 
information compared to 0% (12%) in 1993. Accounting research provides important insights 
about how CSR performance relates to voluntary CSR disclosure and how this disclosure 
influences market participants. 
As a starting point, a number of accounting studies (e.g., Cowen et al., 1987; Deegan and 
Gordon, 1996; Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2014) have 
examined the determinants of voluntary CSR disclosure. These studies report that larger firms, 
more profitable firms, and firms with more capital provided more CSR disclosure. These 
findings may indicate that, because CSR disclosure is costly, firms with greater resources are 
better able to bear these costs. Relatedly, these studies report that firms with greater media 
coverage provided more CSR disclosure. This could be because firms in the media spotlight are 
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simply bigger and therefore have greater resources or because they face greater stakeholder 
pressure to be socially responsible due to their increased visibility. Finally, these studies also find 
better corporate governance as well as industry membership have influenced CSR disclosure, 
evidenced by firms in industries that typically create more pollution (e.g., the chemical, 
automotive, and utility industries) providing relatively more CSR disclosure.  
There are competing theories that predict how CSR performance in the prior period(s) 
will relate to current CSR disclosure. On one hand, voluntary disclosure theory (Verrechia, 1983; 
Dye, 1985) predicts a positive correlation because socially responsible companies may want to 
distinguish themselves from those who aren’t socially responsible. On the other hand, socio-
political theories (Gray et al., 1995; Patten, 2002) predict a negative correlation because 
companies who are not socially responsible may increase their disclosure volume to try to 
persuade stakeholders that they are responsible. In an attempt to distinguish between these 
competing theories, Clarkson et al. (2008) provide some evidence in support of both theories. 
That is, they report that good CSR performers disclosed more CSR information overall than bad 
CSR performers, supporting voluntary disclosure theory. However, when they broke down the 
CSR disclosures into verifiable (i.e., hard) disclosures and non-verifiable (i.e., soft) disclosures, 
they found that firms who performed poorly with respect to CSR in the prior period were more 
likely to make “soft” CSR disclosures, including declarative statements about their commitment 
to being socially responsible. Thus, it appears that socio-political theory may be more applicable 
with respect to soft disclosures but voluntary disclosure theory is relatively more applicable for 
CSR disclosure in general.  
The findings of Clarkson et al. (2008) with respect to “soft” CSR disclosure can be 
interpreted as strategic disclosure. This interpretation is consistent with Martin and Moser (2014) 
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who designed a laboratory market in which managers chose what information, if any, to disclose 
to shareholders about a costly CSR project. They report that managers were more inclined to 
provide CSR disclosure when they made a costly CSR investment compared to when they made 
no CSR investment, but that the content of the disclosure focused on the societal benefits of the 
investment rather than the cost to the company. This suggests that managers believe shareholders 
gain utility from learning of a positive externality their capital provided but perhaps gain 
disutility if the specific cost of creating a positive externality is revealed. Further evidence of 
strategic CSR disclosure is provided by Cho et al. (2010) who examined the optimism and 
certainty conveyed in firms’ CSR disclosures and found that disclosures of poor CSR performers 
were more optimistic and less certain than good CSR performers. 
While many studies have examined the determinants and effects of CSR disclosure 
volume, there is very little accounting research on CSR disclosure quality. Two exceptions are 
Plumlee et al. (2015) and Zahller et al. (2015). Plumlee et al. (2015) based their measure of 
quality on the firm’s disclosure conformance to the Global Reporting Initiative’s disclosure 
index. Using this measure, they report that voluntary CSR disclosure quality in the U.S. is 
positively related to the disclosing firm’s future cash flow. Interestingly, this relationship is 
independent of firms’ actual prior CSR performance. However, the authors did not find a relation 
between CSR disclosure quality and the firm’s cost of equity capital. Thus, there appears to be 
some relation between CSR disclosure quality and firm value, although exactly why this is the 
case is not yet clear or understood. In an experiment with retail investors, Zahller et al. (2015) 
shed some light on one way CSR disclosure quality can enhance firm value. Specifically, they 
report that higher quality disclosures (i.e., disclosures that are quantifiable, comparable, and 
complete) increased the perceived organizational legitimacy of a company among investors. In 
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turn, the increased organizational legitimacy made investors less likely to sell the company’s 
stock following a negative exogenous shock.18  
In addition to the Eccles et al. (2014) study discussed earlier, a number of other 
accounting studies provide evidence that supports the idea that CSR positively contributes to 
firm value. While Eccles et al. (2014) used stock price and accounting returns (i.e., return on 
assets and return on equity) as proxies for firm value, these other studies demonstrate additional 
avenues through which CSR can enhance firm value. For instance, Plumlee et al. (2015) found 
that better CSR performance produced higher expected future cash flows and Chakravarthy et al. 
(2014) report that CSR disclosure boosted firms’ reputations. CSR has also been found to reduce 
firms’ cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). One possible explanation for this is that CSR 
disclosure reduces information asymmetry between firms and market participants. This assertion 
is supported by Cho et al. (2013), who report that CSR performance information decreased bid-
ask spreads for firms with a high proportion of institutional investors. Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. 
(2012) found that voluntary CSR disclosure reduced analyst forecast error.  
Within the accounting CSR literature, qualitative and experimental studies provide useful 
insight into how CSR disclosure influences retail investors. For example, in a survey of retail 
investors, Cohen et al. (2011) report that these investors believed CSR information was less 
relevant for investing decisions than economic and governance information. Yet, there is 
evidence that CSR information does matter to retail investors, even though it may be perceived 
as relatively less relevant than other types of information. For instance, in an experimental 
                                                          
18 Zahller et al. (2015) explain organizational legitimacy as follows: “Organizations seek to establish congruence 
between the social value associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behavior in the 
larger social system of which they are a part….When an actual or potential disparity exists between the two value 
systems, there will exist a threat to organizational legitimacy. These threats take the form of legal, economic, or 
other social sanctions.” (Zahller et al., 2015, p. 12). 
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market, Martin and Moser (2014) report that retail investors were willing to pay a premium for 
ownership in a company that disclosed its CSR activities compared to a company that did not. 
One possible moderator to investors’ positive stock price response to CSR may be the strategic 
link between a CSR activity and the firm’s operations. That is, Cheng et al. (2015) report that 
retail investors valued CSR, but only when it was linked to a firm’s operational strategy. 
Relatedly, Wang and Tuttle (2014) found that retail investors used CSR as a signal about 
management credibility which positively influenced the firm’s financial disclosure credibility 
and the stock price investors were willing to pay for the company. However, the results of an 
experiment by Elliott et al. (2013) suggests that a positive link between CSR and stock price 
should be interpreted with caution. This is because retail investors’ reaction to CSR might be 
unintentional. Specifically, Elliott et al. (2013) report that retail investors’ positive stock-price 
reaction to CSR was affect-driven and disappeared when the source of the positive affect was 
made salient.  
2.4 CSR Reporting Models 
Because CSR reporting is a relatively new phenomenon for managers, many of them rely 
on CSR reporting models to help guide the construction of their CSR disclosures. These models 
have been developed in the absence of a comprehensive CSR reporting model from regulators 
(KPMG et al., 2013), making the majority of today’s CSR disclosures voluntary. Two of the 
primary functions of these models are to help managers identify what CSR information is 
relevant for disclosure and to guide managers’ preparation and presentation of their CSR 
disclosures, thereby providing credibility and rigor to the CSR reporting process (Ionnaou and 
Serafeim, 2012; KPMG et al., 2013). However, these models differ in many of their specific 
disclosure prescriptions.  
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Two of the key differences among these models are the stakeholder audience to whom 
the CSR disclosures are directed and the report where the disclosures will be located. For 
example, with respect to audience, some models recommend that CSR disclosures be prepared 
with consideration for all stakeholders, whereas other models suggest CSR disclosures be 
directed to capital providers. With respect to disclosure location, some models recommend firms 
prepare a stand-alone Sustainability Report whereas the others recommend firms disclose their 
CSR activities in a financial report such as the Management Discussion & Analysis section of the 
10-K. A survey of current disclosure practice reflects these divergent disclosure prescriptions. 
For example, while a large proportion of firms disclose in a separate sustainability report (Ballou 
et al., 2012), a growing number of firms are also disclosing CSR information in the annual 
report.19 Specifically, KPMG (2013) states that 51% of reporting companies around the globe 
disclose CSR information in their annual report, which is up from 9% in 2008. In addition, the 
Investor Responsibility Research Institute and the Sustainable Investments Institute indicate that 
499 of the S&P 500 companies currently make some form of CSR disclosure in a financial filing 
(IRRC, 2013). 
In addition to the variation of CSR disclosure practices discussed above, a general 
concern exists about the lack of comparability and consistency for CSR information across firms 
and over time (KPMG et al., 2013). One proposed solution to this issue is greater disclosure 
standardization via a mandatory reporting model, and this approach is receiving increasing 
support among stakeholders, academics, government officials, and governing bodies (Social 
Investment Forum, 2009; United Nations, 2012; KPMG et al., 2013; Sulkowski and Waddock, 
                                                          
19 Holder-Webb et al. (2009) report a negative correlation between CSR disclosure in a mandatory filing (like the 




2014; Hales, 2015). It is also being embraced by some standard setters and regulators who are 
expressing a desire to harmonize the various CSR reporting models and disclosure requirements 
(KPMG et al., 2013). Even as this notion of CSR disclosure standardization gains additional 
support, there is a paucity of research to inform regulators and standard setters about how 
different CSR reporting audiences and locations affect firm behavior and what the implications 
might be for stakeholders.  
2.5 The Manager’s Dilemma 
In addition to capital providers, other stakeholders (including activists) can also motivate 
firms to engage in CSR. However, these stakeholders’ demands may or may not be associated 
with CSR activities that translate into firm value (Moser and Martin, 2012). For example, a 
variety of stakeholder groups would like certain energy firms to install smokestack scrubbers to 
reduce the pollution they emit into the atmosphere, but this is a costly venture. In these kinds of 
situations, CSR introduces a new type of complexity into the principal-agent setting (Carroll, 
1991; Moser and Martin, 2012; Hales, 2015). One of the reasons for this is because, in addition 
to meeting the needs of capital providers by maximizing financial benefits, managers now 
increasingly consider meeting the needs of additional stakeholder groups (e.g., communities, 
customers, etc.) for whom social benefits may loom larger than financial benefits. In this setting, 
managers are often faced with situations where the financial and social objectives of an 
investment conflict, requiring managers to make tradeoffs between the interests of various 
stakeholder constituencies (Moser and Martin, 2012; Huang and Watson, 2015).20 For example, 
                                                          
20 Managers clearly have economic motives to consider capital providers when making capital allocation decisions, 
but as discussed above, their motivation to consider other stakeholders may be economic and non-economic. 
Economically, managers who attend to other stakeholders’ interests may do so to improve the firm’s public image, 
to manage firm risk, to reduce production costs, to recruit and retain employees, to stave off unionization attempts, 
to attract customers, to prevent consumer boycotts, and to reduce the threat of regulatory intervention (Sprinkle and 
Maines, 2010; Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012).  Alternatively, one non-economic motive is that managers may 
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when an investment offers a high social benefit but a low financial return, a manager must weigh 
the cost of the investment to capital providers against the benefit to other stakeholder groups. It 




                                                          
believe that acting in non-financial stakeholders’ interests is simply the right thing to do (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; 







Accountability is a pervasive feature of the natural decision-environment (Tetlock, 1985; 
Buchman et al., 1996). This is because it is widely accepted that individuals are autonomous 
(Bandura, 1977). That is, individuals are agents for their decisions and actions (Heider, 1944) 
and therefore it is normative for society to hold individuals accountable for their decisions 
(Tetlock, 1992). Consequently, accountability constitutes a crucial link between individual 
decision-makers and the society in which they operate (Tetlock, 1985).  
Individuals feel accountable when they anticipate they may be evaluated by a salient 
audience for their actions or decisions and that this evaluation may potentially result in a reward 
or punishment (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). It is important to note that there only need be a non-
zero probability of an evaluation to induce accountability. That is, some probability of evaluation 
greater than 0% appears to be sufficient (Tan, 1995; Tan and Kao, 1999). Another condition to 
note is that the evaluation by a salient audience can take many different forms. For instance, 
prior experimental research on accountability has successfully operationalized an evaluation as a 
simple third-party observation, a formal review by a peer or a superior, or a requirement for 
individuals to justify their behavior or decision(s) to a peer or superior (Lerner and Tetlock, 
1999).21  
                                                          
21 Accounting studies on accountability have operationalized an evaluation as the pressure to justify one’s actions or 
decisions to others (Emby and Gibbins, 1988; Ashton, 1990; Johnson and Kaplan, 1991; Kennedy, 1993; Kennedy, 
1995; Glover, 1997; Hoffman and Patton, 1997; Asare et al., 2000; DeZoort et al., 2006), a third-party review (Lord, 
1992; Koonce et al., 1995; Tan, 1995; Tan and Kao, 1999), and third-party feedback (Ashton, 1990; Cloyd, 1997; 
DeZoort et al., 2006).  
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The rewards or punishments associated with accountability that can be administered to 
decision-makers can vary widely. Tetlock (1985, 1992) identifies specific types of 
reward/punishment that are economically- or psychologically-based. One pertains to wealth and 
power. Specifically, the evaluating audience may control economic resources that they can 
bestow upon or withhold/revoke from the decision-maker. For instance, the audience may have 
financial or other assets the decision-maker desires. The audience may also be able to advance 
the position of the decision-maker within an organization and grant her rights or authority she 
does not currently possess. Individuals’ desire for wealth and power is steeped in a long tradition 
of economics and is widely accepted. Thus, granting wealth and power is an economic form of 
reward and punishment and withholding or rescinding them can be construed as an economic 
punishment.  
Another form of reward or punishment identified by Tetlock (1985, 1992) relates to the 
decision-maker’s social-image.22 Humans are psychologically motivated to enhance their social-
image, and the approval (disapproval) of others has a strong positive (negative) influence on that 
(Baumeister, 1982, Leary and Kowalski, 1990).23 For example, with respect to social-image, 
prior psychology studies report that charitable donations and helping behavior are higher when 
they are visible to society (Satow, 1975; Gottlieb and Carver, 1980). As another example, 
conformity to popular opinion, which is one way to gain social approval, is greater in public 
settings than in private settings (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). In addition, individuals tend to be 
more likely to deflect blame for a failure to external sources rather than accept the blame when 
                                                          
22 Consistent with Baumeister (1982), the social contingency model also posits that the desire to obtain and maintain 
a positive self-image is a third type of reward or punishment that can motivate different coping behaviors in 
response to accountability pressures.  
23 Tetlock (1985) indicates the idea that social image can alter behavior is related to research in psychology on 
ingratiation, conformity, and strategic attitude shifts.  
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the failure is public rather than private (Weary, 1980). Taken together, these examples and a 
number of others (see Baumeister, 1982 for a review), provide support for the approval 
(disapproval) of others being an influential psychologically-based reward/punishment for 
decision-makers. Accordingly, it is common for individuals to seek out the approval of others or, 
at a minimum, avoid their disapproval.  
In summary, because individuals are generally wealth-maximizers and status-seekers, the 
threat of reward or punishment from an evaluating audience plays a very important role in 
decision-making as it can constrain individuals’ actions and decisions (Tetlock, 1985). Based on 
this notion of accountability, I next review the accountability literature and elaborate on how 
accountability can specifically influence individuals’ decisions and actions. 
3.2 The Social Contingency Model 
The social contingency model of judgment and choice (Tetlock, 1985, 1992) provides a 
theoretical basis to predict how individuals’ decisions are influenced by accountability. This 
model outlines how decision-makers cope when faced with accountability pressures in a variety 
of different settings. For instance, it explores how a decision-maker copes with accountability 
pressures that arise both before she makes a decision and afterwards.24 It also discusses coping 
when a decision-maker knows or does not know who her evaluating audience is or what the 
preferences of her audience are.25  
                                                          
24 Predecisional accountability occurs when individuals knows they will be evaluated by a salient audience with the 
potential for reward or punishment before they make their decision or act, whereas postdecisional accountability is 
when individuals are told a salient audience will evaluate their decisions and actions after those decisions have 
already been made or those actions have already been taken (see Lerner and Tetlock, 1999, for a review). In the case 
of postdecisional accountability, the social contingency model predicts individuals will engage in defensive 
bolstering (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). Specifically, they become more entrenched in and rigorously defend their 
prior decision or action (Tetlock et al., 1989; Tetlock and Lerner, 1999). As this type of accountability is not 
specifically germane to my study, I do not discuss it further. 
25 The accounting setting I examine is one in which a manager can reasonably ascertain the preferences of her 
audience. If the audience’s preferences are unknown or not reasonably ascertained, the social contingency model 
suggests the decision-maker will increase her effort and consider more information and a more balanced set of 
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The specific setting of interest to my study is predecisional accountability to a known 
audience. That is, before making a decision, a decision-maker knows she will be evaluated by an 
audience and she also knows who that audience is. Importantly, because the audience is known, 
the decision-maker can either know or reasonably anticipate what the audience’s preference is. In 
this setting, the social contingency model predicts that when a decision-maker is accountable for 
her decision, she will seek to make the most defensible decision. That is, she will seek to make 
the decision that she can best justify to her audience and that is likely to maximize the 
probability of reward or minimize the probability of punishment from her audience. Intuitively, 
the decision that her audience will be most pleased with is one that is consistent with the 
audience’s preference. Consequently, the social contingency model predicts that a decision-
maker will be heavily influenced by what she perceives her audience’s preference to be, even to 
the point that she may adopt the audience’s preference as her own and act consistently with that 
preference.26 Tetlock terms this behavior as the acceptability heuristic. 
In addition to maximizing (minimizing) the probability of gaining the audience’s 
approval (disapproval), another feature of the acceptability heuristic for the decision-maker is 
that it simplifies her decision and minimizes the cognitive effort she needs to exert to arrive at a 
decision. That is, rather than gathering and evaluating multiple pieces of information to make a 
decision, the decision-maker can shortcut this process by simply identifying and adopting the 
preference of her audience. This effort-minimization approach is consistent with cognitive 
                                                          
information to arrive at her decision (see Tetlock, 1983, 1985, 1992; Tetlock et al., 1989; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; 
Tetlock and Lerner, 1999). These results have been supported by a number of accounting studies (e.g., Kennedy, 
1993; Koonce et al., 1995; Tan, 1995; Cloyd, 1997; Asare et al., 2000). 
26 The accountability literature examines whether adopting the audience’s preference is a temporary, impression 
management strategy, or a more permanent shift as a result of fundamental changes to the decision-maker’s 
cognitive assessment. This literature is inconclusive, providing evidence of both, conditional upon a number of 
moderators (see Lerner and Tetlock, 1999 for a review). However, for the purpose of this study, the critical factor is 
that the audience does have an influence on a decision-maker at the time the decision is being made, regardless of 
the duration of that influence subsequent to the decision. 
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models in the psychology literature (see Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Chaiken and Trope, 1999; 
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013) which suggest that human beings, 
in many settings, tend to behave like cognitive misers. That is, individuals seek to conserve 
cognitive resources when making decisions and expend those resources only as necessary (e.g., 
when a more efficient cognitive process does not yield a viable solution). As a result, many of 
the decisions humans make tend to be automatic, fast, and nonconscious.  
So in summary, when individuals feel accountable to others for their decisions before 
making that decision, the social contingency model suggests that they will be motivated to gain 
the approval of their audience. One way to do this is by adopting the audience’s preference as 
their own. Thus, this approach becomes a relatively cognitively simple way of making a 
defensible decision.  
Prior research in both psychology (Cialdini et al., 1973; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock et al., 
1989; Klimoski and Inks, 1990) and accounting (Peecher, 1996; Buchman et al., 1996; Hoffman 
and Patton, 1997; Turner, 2001; DeZoort et al., 2006) provide evidence consistent with this 
decision-making behavior. For instance, Tetlock (1983) asked participants in his experiment to 
provide their views on various controversial social issues like capital punishment or national 
defense spending. In this study, Tetlock manipulated whether participants believed that their 
views would be confidential or whether they would be revealed to an audience. Further, if the 
views were revealed to an audience, participants expected to have to justify their views to the 
audience, which they were told were liberal, conservative or unknown. In the two conditions in 
which the audience’s views were stated to be liberal and conservative, Tetlock reports that the 
positions participants took were biased in the same direction of their audience’s view. That is, 
participants who expected to justify their beliefs to a liberal audience took a more liberal position 
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while participants who expected to justify their beliefs to a conservative audience took a more 
conservative position. These results were later replicated by Tetlock et al. (1989).  
The vast majority of the accountability studies in accounting have been conducted in 
experimental auditing settings where auditor-participants are placed in a scenario in which they 
perform a specific auditing task. Accountable auditor participants were typically told that they 
would be required to justify their work to one or more senior auditors or that their work would be 
evaluated by a supervising auditor. Consistent with the social contingency model, auditor 
participants could reasonably anticipate that their supervisors preferred more conservative 
judgments which incentivized them to make more conservative judgments (Hoffman and Patton, 
1997). Consequently, these studies report that, compared to when auditor participants were not 
held accountable for their judgments, accountable auditors made more conservative assessments 
of fraud risk (Hoffman and Patton, 1997) and materiality (DeZoort et al., 2006). They also issued 
more qualified audit opinions (Lord, 1992; Buchman et al., 1996). For instance, Buchman et al. 
(1996) provided auditors with information about a potential lawsuit and asked them how they 
believe the client should report the lawsuit and what audit opinion they would recommend. The 
authors manipulated whether auditors anticipated meeting with either the client’s vice president 
or the audit partner (who is known to be conservative) to review their decisions. They found that 
auditors with experience in this type of decision-setting were significantly influenced by their 
audience. Specifically, experienced auditors who met with the audit partner were more likely to 
recommend a qualified audit opinion while those who met with the client were more likely to 
recommend an unqualified audit opinion.   
In another insightful study that did not directly manipulate accountability, Gaynor et al. 
(2006) recruited experienced corporate directors as experimental participants and looked at 
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whether an audit committee’s decision to hire its auditor for a non-audit service might be 
influenced by the disclosure of this action to investors. The investors in this study, which were 
hypothetical, were the evaluating audience with an implicit ability to reward or punish the 
directors based on their decision. The directors were told that hiring the auditor to perform the 
non-audit services would improve audit quality, even though it may appear to impair auditor 
independence. Consistent with social contingency theory, directors acted as if they believed 
investors would prefer the appearance of auditor independence over audit quality and were less 
willing to hire the auditor when disclosure of the non-audit services was required compared to 
when it was not required. Thus, it seems that the mere imagined anticipation of being held 
accountable for a decision can influence highly-experienced professionals even to the point of 
deterring them from making what is arguably a sound business decision.27 
While the social contingency model and prior accountability research provide clear 
predictions for decision-making settings in which the preference of an audience is perceived to 
uniformly favor one position over another, predictions for when an audience has a dispersion of 
preferences have been given less attention and are therefore less clear. By dispersion of 
preferences, I mean that a large proportion of the audience has one preference and another large 
proportion of the audience has a conflicting preference. One study, Green et al. (2000), examined 
this setting of disperse audience preferences. They provide evidence that, because a defensible 
decision is ambiguous, decision makers employ strategies to avoid making a decision such as 
                                                          
27 Similarly, Adelberg and Batson (1978) report the results of an experiment that examined the efficiency of 
financial aid distribution to applicants when the distributor had to report to the financial aid office or to the 
applicants. Thus, the study manipulates whether the distributor is accountable to the aid office or to the applicants. 
Adelberg and Batson find that, in the setting where the available aid was limited such that it was only effective if it 
went to some but not all of the applicants, the distributors allocated the aid efficiently when they were accountable 
to the aid office but not when they are accountable to the applicants. That is, distributors allocated aid to some 
applicants and not others when accountable to the aid office so that at least some applicants could benefit. However, 
distributors allocated aid to all applicants when they were accountable to the applicants which essentially rendered 
the aid ineffective for all applicants. 
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ignoring the decision, delegating it to another individual, or postponing the decision. However, 
there is little research evidence of what decision-makers are likely to do when a decision must be 
made. That is, in many settings, delaying or deflecting a decision is simply not an option and 
decision-makers must act. Tetlock (1992) speculates that, in a setting of disperse audience 
preferences, the decision-maker will likely increase their cognitive effort and engage in 
additional information processing (p. 347). This response is consistent with both dual-process 
theories in psychology (Chaiken and Trope, 1999) and with research on accountability increasing 
a decision-maker’s effort when the audience preference is unknown (see Footnote 25 above). 
Thus, if anything, it seems that in settings when a decision-maker is accountable to an audience 
with disperse and conflicting preferences, she may be inclined to expend more effort, search for 
more information, and consider a broader information set compared to when the audience’s 
preference uniformly favors a single position.  
3.3 CSR Reporting Models and Managers’ Decisions 
 In today’s business setting, managers are faced with a wide range of accountability 
pressures from various stakeholder groups, and I expect that these accountability pressures will 
influence managers’ behavior (Pondeville et al., 2013; Rodrigue et al., 2013). Consistent with the 
research cited above and as outlined in Figure 1, I propose that the disclosure audience and 
location made salient by a CSR reporting model will jointly influence how accountable managers 
feel for financial and social performance which will affect their capital allocations. Specifically, I 
posit that managers will consider the preference of the disclosure audience in an effort to identify 
the most defensible decision. If the audience’s preference uniformly favors financial or social 
benefits, I predict managers will make a capital allocation consistent with that preference. 








social benefits, I predict managers will then consider the disclosure location to identify the most 
defensible decision. Thus, when the disclosure audience is exclusively capital providers, 
managers will be more likely to invest in projects that favor financial benefits over social 
benefits because they believe capital providers prefer financial performance to social 
performance. However, when the audience has disperse and conflicting preferences between 
financial and social benefits, as is likely the case when the disclosure audience includes both 
capital providers and other stakeholders, managers will be more likely to invest in projects that 
favor financial benefits (social benefits) when disclosing in MD&A (Sustainability Report). This 
is because I expect managers will perceive that the content of the overall MD&A is more 
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financially oriented and will more likely associate it with a capital-provider audience compared 
to a Sustainability Report. By comparison, I expect managers will perceive that a Sustainability 
Report is more socially oriented and will more likely associate it with a broad stakeholder 
audience relative to MD&A.28 Consequently, managers disclosing to all stakeholders in MD&A 
will feel more accountable for financial performance and managers disclosing in a Sustainability 
Report will feel more accountable for social performance.  
Based on the above, I expect disclosure audience and location to jointly influence 
managers’ capital allocations. Specifically, I expect managers’ capital allocations to be weighted 
toward financial benefits when they direct their CSR disclosures to only capital providers and/or 
when they disclose their CSR information in MD&A. In contrast, I expect managers disclosing 
to all stakeholders in a Sustainability Report to weight their capital allocations toward social 
benefits. Accordingly, my first hypothesis, which is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2, is as 
follows: 
H1: Given the choice between financial and social benefits, managers allocate more 
capital to activities that provide superior financial benefits when disclosing to just capital 
providers and/or when disclosing in MD&A compared to when disclosures are directed 
to all stakeholders in a Sustainability Report. 
 
 I also expect differences in managers’ capital allocations to be driven by how accountable 
they feel for financial and social performance. Therefore, my second hypothesis is: 
H2: The joint influence of the disclosure audience and location is mediated by how 
accountable managers feel for financial and social performance. 
 
  
                                                          
28 Evidence supporting this expectation is discussed in Section 6.3 below. 
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     Figure 2 Panel A: H1 Prediction 













































4.1 Experimental Design  
To test my hypotheses, I conduct a 2x2 between-participant experiment by manipulating 
the CSR disclosure audience and location. I manipulate audience by telling participants that their 
CSR disclosures will be directed to investors and lenders (“capital providers”) or to investors, 
lenders, communities, governments, non-governmental organizations, customers, and suppliers 
(“all stakeholders”).29 I manipulate location by telling participants that their CSR disclosures will 
primarily be communicated in the Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A) in the annual report or in a Sustainability 
Report.30  
To help ensure that there are no differences in participants’ understanding of the 
stakeholder groups they disclose to and the report they disclose in, participants receive a brief 
description of each stakeholder group they will disclose to and a summary of the general purpose 
of the report where their CSR disclosures will be made. The description for MD&A is taken 
directly from SEC Interpretation 33-8350: Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s 
                                                          
29 While not exhaustive, the list of stakeholders in the “all stakeholders” condition includes many of the most 
common stakeholder groups representing a wide range of stakeholder interests and is reflective of most of the 
stakeholders identified by public companies in their CSR disclosures. For example, ExxonMobil’s 2013 Corporate 
Citizenship Report lists governments, shareholders, suppliers, customers, employees, communities, NGO’s, and 
academic institutions as their stakeholders. Similarly, in its 2014 Sustainability Report Samsung lists their 
stakeholders as shareholders, suppliers, local communities, government, NGO’s, employees, customers, and media. 
30 Disclosure audience and location may not be orthogonal variables. That is, when considering the disclosure 
location, participants could consider the stakeholders who view the report. However, I chose to manipulate these 
variables because the primary purpose of this study is to provide information about the implications of differences 




Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations.31 This description 
states that the general purposes of the MD&A section are to provide a narrative explanation of a 
company's financial statements that enables investors to see the company through the eyes of 
management; to enhance the overall financial disclosure and provide the context within which 
financial information should be analyzed; and to provide information about the quality of, and 
potential variability of, a company's earnings and cash flow, so that investors can ascertain the 
likelihood that past performance is indicative of future performance. The description of the 
general purpose of a sustainability report is based on GRI’s explanation that sustainability 
reports report a company’s economic, environmental, and social impacts; present a company’s 
values and governance model, and demonstrate the link between its strategy and its commitment 
to a sustainable global economy; and help companies measure, understand and communicate 
their economic, environmental, and social governance performance. 
I use two dependent variables to test my hypotheses. My dependent variable for H1 is 
participants’ capital allocations to a CSR project. My dependent variable for H2 is how 
accountable participants feel for financial and social performance. Each of these measures is 
discussed in more detail below.  
4.2 Experimental Procedure 
The experiment consisted of a paper-and-pencil task and proceeded in four stages. In the 
first stage, participants were given an informed consent letter, instructions for the experiment, 
and three numbered envelopes. Each participant read the informed consent letter and reviewed 
instructions for the experiment. In these instructions, participants were asked to assume the role 
of CEO of XYZ, a publicly-traded U.S. company. They were informed that their task would 
                                                          
31 SEC Interpretation 33-8350 is available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8350.htm. The GRI’s explanation 
of the purpose of a Sustainability Report is available on its website at https://www.globalreporting.org/. 
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involve evaluating information about potential CSR activities, making a decision, and explaining 
their decision. (See Appendix A.) 
In the second stage (see Appendices B and C), participants opened, reviewed, and 
completed the contents of Envelope 1 which contained background information about XYZ and 
three years of selected historical financial information.32 This three year period was one of year-
to-year positive growth, and participants were told that XYZ’s growth rate was consistent with 
the median growth rate among firms in XYZ’s industry. Holding XYZ’s financial performance 
constant across conditions allows me to control for the positive correlation between financial 
performance and CSR activities documented by prior research (e.g., Schmitz and Schrader, 2013; 
Lys et al., 2014). Next, participants received information about their role as CEO, which 
included selecting and funding CSR activities as well as overseeing XYZ’s CSR disclosures. 
Participants were then informed about the reporting model that they used. Specifically, they were 
told which stakeholders their disclosures would be directed to and where these disclosures would 
primarily be located. Subsequently, participants were given specific information about two 
potential CSR activities they would evaluate—A and B—both of which are expected to reduce 
the volume of water XYZ uses.33,34 Both A and B are expected to produce positive financial 
benefits and positive social benefits (via reduced water use). However, the expected benefits for 
A exceed XYZ’s hurdle rate but fall short of XYZ’s annual water reduction target. By 
                                                          
32 XYZ and its selected financial information are based on a real U.S. public company, InvenSense, Inc. However, 
the company name and other identifying information was changed to ensure that any familiarity with InvenSense 
does not affect participant responses.  
33 In the experimental materials (provided in the Appendices), these two projects were referred to as Activity A and 
Activity B. 
34 According to Corporate Knights Capital (2014), water usage is one of seven basic CSR indicators. In addition, 
over 80 (approximately 20%) listed companies in the information technology sector—the same sector as 
InvenSense, Inc.—provided CSR disclosures about their water use in 2012 (Corporate Knights Capital, 2014). 
Examples of other public companies that disclose water use information include Sony, Coca Cola, Ford, Walmart, 
Darden Restaurants, and ExxonMobil.  
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comparison, the expected benefits of B exceed XYZ’s annual water reduction target but fall short 
of XYZ’s hurdle rate. Next, participants were told that A and B could be undertaken 
simultaneously or independently and were asked to fully allocate a fixed but unknown amount of 
capital between them. The percentage of capital participants allocated to project A is the primary 
dependent variable in my experiment.35 After making their allocation, participants were asked to 
provide an explanation of their allocation decision and its benefits for inclusion in the CSR 
disclosures. To complete the second stage, participants placed their materials back in Envelope 1.  
In the third stage of the experiment participants removed the contents of Envelope 2 and 
completed the manipulation check questions. After they placed their responses to the 
manipulation check questions back in Envelope 2, participants proceeded to stage four of the 
experiment. In the fourth stage, participants answered questions from Envelope 3 pertaining to 
their allocation decision, accountability, and demographics. After they answered the 
demographic questions, participants delivered all of their materials to the experimenter and 
received their compensation. 
4.3 Participants  
I recruit 109 individuals in a MBA class to participate in my study. Using MBA participants 
as proxies for managers is consistent with prior accounting research (Lipe and Salterio, 2000; 
Banker et al., 2004; Libby et al., 2004; Kelly, 2007; Jackson, 2008; Beaudoin et al., 2013; 
Rennekamp et al., 2015). Demographic information for my participants is summarized in Table 1. 
Of my 109 participants, 73.39% are male. On average, participants are 29.58 years old (S.D. = 
4.42 years), have 6.20 years of general work experience (S.D. = 4.19), 2.25 years of management 
experience (S.D. = 2.91), and have taken 4.46 accounting and finance courses (S.D. = 4.16). Of 
                                                          
35 By design, participants make a zero-sum allocation between the two projects. As a result, statistical are identical 
using capital allocations to either CSR project. 
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Table 1: Participant Demographic Information 1 
 















Male (%) 73.39% 76.36% 70.37% 70.91% 75.93% 
Age (years) 2 29.58 28.94 30.22 29.47 29.70 
Work Experience 
(years) 
6.20 5.83 6.57 6.20 6.20 
Management 
Experience (years) 
2.25 1.75 2.77 2.20 2.30 
Accounting & 
Finance Courses 

























1. Demographic information for all 109 participants is presented in the All Conditions column. Demographic 
information for the Capital Providers, All Stakeholders, MD&A, and Sustainability Report conditions are 
provided in the columns bearing the same name. The figures reported in each row are as follows: the Male row 
indicates the percentage of male participants; the Age row reports participants age in years; the Work 
Experience row states participants’ years of work experience; the Management Experience row indicates the 
years of management work experience; the Accounting & Finance Courses row reports the number of 
undergraduate and graduate level accounting and finance courses participants have taken; and the Democrat, 
Republican, Independent, and Other row provides the percentage of participants who identify with each 
respective political party.   
2. One participant in the Capital Providers/Sustainability Report condition did not provide their age. A different 




the 108 participants who provided information about their political affiliations, 35.19% identified 
as democrat, 29.63% as republican, 26.85% as independent, and 8.33% as other. With the 
exception of management experience, there are no significant differences across conditions in the 
49 
 
measured demographic variables (all p-values > 0.10).36 However, when management experience 
is included as a covariate in the hypotheses tests below, inferences are unchanged.   
Each participant received $10.00 as compensation for completing the study. I do not 
expect that the absence of financial incentives to allocate capital to a project that maximizes 
financial performance affects the generalizability of my study. If I had used stronger financial 
incentives, then I would expect an increase in capital allocations that favored financial benefits 
across all experimental conditions, making it more difficult to detect differences across my 
experimental conditions. However, I would still expect the pattern of my predictions to hold.  
 
  
                                                          
36 The difference between the average management experience in the Capital Providers condition (1.75 years) and 






5.1 Manipulation Check Questions 
 To determine whether participants attended to the audience manipulation, I ask them to 
recall the stakeholder groups to which they directed their CSR disclosures. Forty-seven of fifty-
five participants (85.45%) disclosing to just capital providers answered this question correctly 
compared to fifty-two out of fifty-four participants (96.30%) disclosing to all stakeholders. I also 
ask participants to recall where their CSR disclosures would be made. Forty-eight of fifty-five 
participants (87.27%) answered this question correctly in the MD&A condition while fifty-one 
out of fifty-four (94.44%) answered this question correctly in the Sustainability Report condition. 
Because testing my hypothesis presupposes that participants attend to my manipulations, I 
exclude the 18 participants who fail to answer either acquisition check question correctly from 
my analyses, resulting in a sample size of 91 participants. The number of participants excluded 
do not differ across experimental conditions (all p’s > 0.10) and including these participants 
produces similar statistical results, except as noted below.  
5.2 Hypotheses Tests 
Participants make their capital allocations to two projects—A and B—by selecting the 
percentage of a fixed amount of capital they will allocate to each. Allocations can range from 0% 
to 100% for each project, and the sum of the percentages allocated to the two projects are 





Table 2: Participant Capital Allocations 
  
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics: Mean and (standard deviation) 

















































Audience x Location 2271.35 1 2271.35 2.84 0.048* 
Residual 51.11 2 25.55 0.03 0.969 
Error 69492.93 87 798.77   
 
Panel C:  Simple Main Effects 
 df F-stat p-value 
Effect of  location when audience is capital providers 
1 0.15 0.882 
Effect of location when audience is all stakeholders 












Table 2 presents descriptive statistics, contrast-coded ANOVA, and simple main effects tests 
for participants’ capital allocations. Participants are asked to allocate a fixed but unspecified 
amount of capital between two CSR activities: one that provides superior financial benefits 
but inferior social benefits (project A), and one that provides inferior financial benefits but 
superior social benefits (project B). Allocations are made to each project as a percentage of 
the fixed capital, ranging from 0% to 100%. The numbers in Panel A reflect participant 
allocations to project A. The four cells in my experiment receive the following contrast 
weights: capital providers/MD&A = +1, capital providers/Sustainability Report = +1, all 
stakeholders/MD&A = +1, all stakeholders/Sustainability Report = -3. * Indicates a one-
tailed p-value to reflect my directional predictions. All other p-values are two-tailed. 
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allocations to project A, which is the project that provides high financial benefits but low social 
benefits. These allocations are depicted in Figure 2, Panel B. H1 predicts an interaction of 
disclosure audience and location such that participant allocations to project A will be lowest 
when disclosing to all stakeholders in a Sustainability Report and that allocations to project A 
will be approximately the same in all other conditions. I test this hypothesis with a contrast-
coded analysis of variance (ANOVA) because doing so provides superior statistical power to the 
traditional ANOVA for testing ordinal interactions while also controlling for Type I error rates 
(Buckless and Ravenscroft, 1990). The contrast weights I use are as follows: +1 in the capital 
providers/MD&A condition, +1 in the capital providers/Sustainability Report condition, +1 in 
the all stakeholders/MD&A condition, and -3 in the all stakeholders/Sustainability Report 
condition.  
The results of the interaction test, as reported in Panel B of Table 2, are consistent with 
H1 (p = 0.048, one-tailed).37,38 Additionally, the insignificant residual variation reported in Panel 
B (p = 0.969, two-tailed) suggests that the differences in participants’ capital allocations across 
my experimental conditions are not significantly explained by anything other than the predicted 
contrast-coded interaction (Keppel and Wickens, 2004, p. 82-83). Tests of simple main effects, 
reported in Panel C, also provide support for the interaction. Specifically, disclosure location 
does not appear to influence participants’ capital allocations when the audience is capital 
                                                          
37 This interaction remains significant using alternative contrast weights consistent with the allocations of 
participants disclosing to only capital providers and/or disclosing in the MD&A being higher than the allocations of 
participants disclosing to all stakeholders in a Sustainability Report.  
38 Given my directional hypothesis for the audience x location interaction, I report a one-tailed p-value for this 
contrast-coded ANOVA test. See McNeil et al. (1996, pp. 137-139) for a discussion of the logic of using one-tailed 
tests for directional interaction predictions. 
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providers (p = 0.882, two-tailed), but does when the audience is all stakeholders (p = 0.071, one-
tailed). Taken together, these results provide support for H1.39,40  
H2 predicts that the differences in participants’ capital allocations will be driven by how 
accountable they felt for financial and social performance.41 To determine whether the disclosure 
audience and location affect how accountable participants felt, I ask four questions following 
their allocation decision. These questions ask participants to indicate the extent to which they 
agree with statements suggesting they felt their allocation 1) needed to produce the best financial 
return possible, 2) needed to produce the best social benefit possible, 3) should be consistent 
with the preferences of capital providers, and 4) should be consistent with the preferences of 
non-financial stakeholders. Participants answer each question on an 11-point scale anchored by 
“Don’t agree at all” (0) and “Completely agree” (10). Because participants are required to choose 
between financial and social performance in my study, I multiply participant responses to the 
accountability questions about social performance and other stakeholders by negative one so that 
they range from 0 to -10 to reflect the opposing dimensions to the accountability questions about 
financial performance and capital providers which are coded from 0 to 10. Means (standard 
deviations) for responses to these questions are reported in Panel B of Table 3. I next run a factor  
                                                          
39 I replicate these results using Amazon Mechanical Turk workers as participants. After eliminating participants 
who failed the manipulation check questions (totaling 42% of participants), I detect a significant contrast-coded 
interaction (p = 0.002, one-tailed) after controlling for participants’ individual CSR preferences. This significant 
interaction is supported by a significant simple main effect of location when the disclosure audience includes all 
stakeholders (p = 0.021, one-tailed) but not when the audience is solely capital providers (p = 0.556, two-tailed). 
40 Including participants who incorrectly answer the manipulation check questions also yields a marginally 
significant contrast coded interaction (p = 0.053, one-tailed), an insignificant contrast model residual (p = 0.830, 
two-tailed), and an insignificant simple main effect of location when the disclosure audience is capital providers (p = 
0.704, two-tailed). However, the simple main effect of location becomes insignificant when the audience is all 
stakeholders (p = 0.145, one-tailed).  
41 As discussed in Section 3.1, the social contingency model predicts that managers will feel accountable when they 
can potentially be rewarded or punished for their decisions by an evaluating stakeholder audience. Importantly, these 
rewards or punishments can take many forms, including social and reputational rewards and punishments. Using a 
vignette, my experiment assumes participants will place themselves in the mindset of managers and anticipate how 
stakeholders will respond to their decisions. I therefore rely on a reputational reward or punishment via favorable or 
unfavorable stakeholder reactions to create the perception of managerial accountability.    
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Table 3: Reported Accountability 
  
Panel A:  Accountability Mean and (standard deviation) Factor Score 











































Panel B:  Participant Accountability Responses 
 Capital 
Providers / 
MD&A          




Report (n = 23) 
All 
Stakeholders / 
MD&A        




Report (n = 25) 
1. Financial return 6.23 (2.56) 5.22 (3.37) 6.67 (2.78) 4.96 (2.30) 
2. Social benefit -4.64 (3.19) -4.74 (3.06) -5.33 (3.17) -6.12 (2.54) 
3. Capital providers 6.27 (3.10) 5.91 (2.56) 6.67 (2.58) 5.80 (2.08) 
4. Other stakeholders -4.00 (2.99) -4.96 (2.77) -4.86 (2.89) -5.72 (1.95) 
 
  
The descriptive statistics above reflect the factor score from a factor 
analysis of responses to the four accountability questions described in 
Panel B below.  
The mean (standard deviation) statistics above reflect participant responses to four questions (reflected in the 
table rows) in each of my four experimental conditions (reflected in the table columns). All four questions ask 
participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a statement that followed. The statement in the first 
question was “I felt like my CSR funding decision for project A and project B needed to produce the 
best financial return possible.” The statement in the second question was “I felt like my CSR funding decision 
for [project] A and [project] B needed to produce the best environmental benefit possible.” The statement in the 
third question was “I felt like my CSR funding decision for [project] A and [project] B should be consistent with 
the preferences of capital providers (i.e., investors and lenders).” The statement in the fourth question was “I felt 
like my CSR funding decision for [project] A and [project] B should be consistent with the preferences of non-
financial stakeholders (i.e., communities, customers, etc.).” Responses to all questions were made on an 11-point 
scale anchored by “Don’t agree at all” (0) and “Completely agree” (10). Responses to statements 2 and 4 were 




analysis on participant responses to these four questions. Results from this analysis report only 
one factor with an eigenvalue (2.34) greater than the cutoff value of 1.00. This factor accounts 
for 58% of the variance in participant responses and all four accountability questions load on this 
factor in the expected direction. Therefore, I use the score from this factor as my measure of 
accountability felt by participants. Means (standard deviations) for this score for each of my four 
experimental conditions are reported in Table 3 Panel A. 
To test H2, I conduct a mediation test to determine if participants’ capital allocations are 
driven by accountability. To do this, I create a dummy variable that equals zero if participants are 
in the capital providers condition and/or in the MD&A condition. The dummy equals one for 
participants in the all stakeholders/Sustainability Report condition.42 I then follow the four-step 
procedure prescribed by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test the mediation. The independent variable 
in this procedure is the dummy variable for my experimental conditions representing the 
interaction of audience and location, the mediator is the measure of accountability derived from 
the factor analysis described above, and the outcome variable is participants’ capital allocations 
to project A. As depicted in Figure 3, step one and step two indicate that the interaction of 
audience and location is significantly associated with participants’ capital allocations (p = 0.047, 
one-tailed) and accountability (p = 0.025, one-tailed), respectively.43 Step three confirms that 
accountability is associated with participants’ allocations (p < 0.001, one-tailed). Finally, step 
                                                          
42 Creating this variable is consistent with my prediction and finding that participants’ capital allocations in the 
capital-providers condition and/or the MD&A condition are not statistically different from one another but are 
collectively statistically different from the allocations of participants in the all stakeholders/Sustainability Report 
condition.  
43 To support the dummy variable coding I use to represent the audience x location interaction to test H2, I remove 
the all stakeholder/Sustainability Report condition from the sample and rerun steps one and two of the mediation 
test. Doing so tests whether there are any effects of disclosing to capital providers and/or in the MD&A on 
participant allocations or on the accountability mediator, which I don’t expect there to be. Consistent with my 
expectations, I do not find a significant effect of these independent variables on capital allocations (p = 0.894, two-
tailed, untabulated) or on the accountability mediator (p = 0.745, two-tailed, untabulated). 
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four indicates that when accountability is controlled for, the effect of the audience-disclosure 
interaction on participants’ allocations becomes insignificant (p = 0.941, two-tailed) while 
accountability remains significant (p < 0.001, one-tailed). Thus, step four confirms that 
accountability fully mediates the effect of the audience x disclosure interaction on participants’ 
allocations, supporting H2.44 
In summary, I find that when the CSR disclosure audience and location are salient, they 
jointly influenced how accountable participants feel for financial and social performance which, 
in turn, affects their capital allocation decisions. That is, my results indicate when the CSR 
reporting model distances CSR disclosure from capital providers’ preferences and a financial 
reporting setting, manager-participants feel relatively more accountable for social performance 
compared to financial performance. Consequently, they shift their capital allocations from 
financial benefits to social benefits.  
  
                                                          
44 I also find evidence that participant allocations in the all-stakeholders condition are influenced by the extent of the 
financial information in the MD&A and Sustainability Report as well as the stakeholders they believe will view the 
report (independent of who the disclosure audience is). However, the effect of these potential mediators on capital 


























Step 3: -0.835*** 
 
Step 2: 0.207** 
 
Audience x Location 
Capital provider audience 
or MD&A location = 0 
All 
stakeholder/Sustainability 
Report condition = 1 
Allocations to Project A 
Accountability 
Step 1: -0.177** 
 
Step 4: -0.004 
  -0.834*** 
 
Figure 3: Test of Mediated Moderation. This figure presents the observed standardized 
coefficients for the four-step mediation procedure prescribed by Baron and Kenny (1986). The 
Audience x Location independent variable is a dummy variable coded 0 if participants are in the 
capital provider audience condition and/or in the MD&A location condition or 1 participants are in 
the all stakeholder/Sustainability Report condition. The mediator variable is the difference score 
between the felt accountability for financial and social performance reported by participants. The 
outcome variable is participants’ capital allocations to project A. *, **, *** denote one-tailed 








 My hypotheses are predicated on a number of assumptions. In the sections that follow, I 
provide evidence to support these assumptions. Specifically, I address my assumptions regarding 
participants’ perception of stakeholder preferences, participants’ beliefs about the uniformity and 
dispersion of the disclosure audience’s preference for financial and social benefits, the relative 
strength of the influence of disclosure audience and location on participants’ capital allocations, 
and the content and viewership participants associated with the disclosure location. I also address 
whether individual participant preferences for CSR influenced their capital allocations.  
6.1 Participant Perception of Stakeholder Preferences 
 I assume that participants perceive capital providers prefer financial benefits to social 
benefits, while, other stakeholders (i.e., non-capital providers) collectively prefer social benefits 
to financial benefits. To verify that this is the case, I ask a post-experimental question to 
participants about what preferences for financial benefits compared to social benefits they 
believe each of seven different stakeholder groups have. These groups include investors, lenders, 
communities, governments, non-governmental organizations, customers, and suppliers. 
Specifically, for each stakeholder group, I ask participants to indicate whether they believe that 
group prefers financial benefits or social benefits on an 11-point scale anchored by “Strongly 
favor financial benefits” (0) and “Strongly favor environmental benefits” (10), with the mid-
point labelled as “Equally favor financial and environmental benefits” (5).  
Descriptive statistics for participant responses to this question are reported in Table 4 
Panel A. One-sample t-tests reported in Panel B support my prediction that participants perceive 
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capital providers prefer financial benefits while other stakeholders prefer social benefits. These t-
tests analyze whether the mean response for capital providers and other stakeholders suggests a 
perceived preference for financial and social benefits, as measured by the difference from the 
mid-point of the response scale. The differences for both capital providers and other stakeholders 
are highly significant. That is, participants believe the collective preference of capital providers 
(i.e., investors and lenders) significantly favors financial benefits (p < 0.001, one-tailed) while 
the collective preference of other stakeholders (i.e., communities, governments, non-
governmental organizations, customers, and suppliers) significantly favors social benefits (p < 
0.001, one-tailed).45  
Next, I directly examine the variance in participants’ beliefs about their stakeholder 
audience’s preference for financial and social benefits between disclosure audience conditions. I 
expect that participants believe a capital provider audience has a uniform preference for financial 
benefits and that an audience that includes all stakeholders has divergent preferences for both 
financial and social benefits. To calculate perceived preference divergence, in the capital 
providers (all stakeholders) condition I average each participant’s response reported in Table 4 
Panel A for investors and lenders (investors, lenders, communities, governments, NGOs, 
customers and suppliers). Next, I calculate the absolute difference between this average and the 
responses for each individual stakeholder group for every participant and then calculate an 
overall mean difference score for each participant. Finally, I calculate an overall mean (s.d.) 
difference score for each audience condition and run a t-test to determine whether the variance  
  
                                                          
45 In fact, the mean participant expectation of stakeholder preferences for each stakeholder group is significantly 
different (all p’s <0.001, two-tailed) from the response scale mid-point indicating that participants perceived each 
stakeholder group has a clear preference for either financial or social benefits.  
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Table 4: Participant Beliefs About Stakeholder Preferences 
  
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) responses 
Stakeholder Groups Responses 
Investors 1.65 (1.92) 
Lenders 1.23 (1.81) 
Communities 8.74 (1.38) 
Governments 6.42 (1.77) 
NGO’s 7.87 (2.05) 
Customers 6.37 (2.46) 
Suppliers 3.05 (2.05) 
 








Capital providers  1.44  
(1.66) 
-3.56 -20.51 < 0.001* 
Other stakeholders  6.49  
(1.09) 
1.49 13.05 < 0.001* 
 









df t-Statistic p-Value 
0.51 (0.70) 2.86 (0.68) -2.34 89 -16.14 < 0.001* 
Panel A provides mean (standard deviation) results to a post-experimental question asking participants to 
“indicate the response that reflects [their] belief about whether each stakeholder group would favor benefits to 
the environment or financial benefits”. Responses were provided for each of the seven stakeholder groups listed 
in Panel A and were made on an 11-point scale anchored by “Strongly favor financial benefits” (0) and 
“Strongly favor environmental benefits” (10), with the mid-point labelled as “Equally favor financial and 
environmental benefits” (5). Panel B provides results for one-sample t-tests when the mean responses in Panel A 
are averaged for capital providers (i.e., investors and lenders) and other stakeholders (i.e., communities, 
governments, NGO’s customers, and suppliers). The t-test specifically tests whether the mean for capital 
providers and other stakeholders differs significantly from the scale mid-point of 5. Panel C reports the mean 
absolute deviations in participants’ perceptions of each stakeholder group’s preferences within their disclosure 
audience from their overall audience preference mean. To calculate the mean absolute deviation of each 
participant in the capital providers (all stakeholders) condition, I averaged each participant’s response reported 
in Panel A for investors and lenders (investors, lenders, communities, governments, NGOs, customers and 
suppliers). I then calculated the absolute difference between this average and the responses for each individual 
stakeholder group for every participant. I then calculated the mean of this absolute deviation for each 
participant. Finally, I calculated an overall mean (s.d.) for this deviation in each audience condition. I then ran a 
t-test to determine whether the difference in this deviation between audience conditions is significant. *Indicates 
a one-tailed p-value to reflect my directional predictions. All other p-values are two –tailed. 
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between the two audience conditions is significant.46 As indicated in Panel C of Table 4, the 
disclosure audience’s perceived preference divergence is larger (p < 0.001, one-tailed) when the 
audience includes all stakeholders (mean = 2.86) than when it is limited to capital providers 
(mean = 0.51). Thus, collectively, the results reported in Table 4 support my assumptions about 
participants’ perceptions of stakeholder preferences. 
6.2 The Relative Influences of Audience and Location 
In constructing my hypotheses, I predicted that the relative influences of the disclosure 
audience and the disclosure location on manager participants’ capital allocations will be 
contingent on the preference uniformity of the disclosure audience. Specifically, when disclosing 
to a capital provider audience with a perceived uniform preference for financial benefits, I expect 
that the influence of the disclosure audience on capital allocations will not be affected by the 
disclosure location. However, when disclosing to all stakeholders with divergent preferences for 
financial and social benefits, I expect that the disclosure location will affect the influence of the 
disclosure audience by making stakeholders with preferences for financial (social) benefits more 
salient when disclosing in MD&A (a Sustainability Report). Consequently, the preferences of the 
more salient stakeholders will be more influential on participants’ capital allocations than the 
preferences of the less salient stakeholders. 
To examine these expectations, I ask participants the extent to which their allocations 
were influenced by the disclosure audience, conditional on location. Responses to this question 
are made on a 7-point scale ranging from “Significantly increased funding to [project] A” (-3) to 
“Significantly increased funding to [project] B” (3), with “Had no effect” as the mid-point (0). 
The pattern of the mean results in each condition, as depicted in Figure 4, is consistent with my 
                                                          




expectations. Disclosure location does not appear to affect the influence of disclosure audience 
on participants’ allocations when disclosing to capital providers but does when disclosing to all 
stakeholders. Further, when disclosing to all stakeholders, MD&A disclosure appears to shift the 
effect of audience on allocations more toward financial benefits while Sustainability Report 
















Figure 4: Influence of Disclosure Audience on Capital Allocations  
 
 
Consistent with my expectations, I test for differences in mean responses to this question 
using a contrast coded ANOVA (Buckless and Ravenscroft, 1990) with the following weights: -1 
in the capital providers/MD&A condition, -1 in the capital providers/Sustainability Report 
condition, -1 in the all stakeholders/MD&A condition, and +3 in the all 

















significant (p < 0.001, one-tailed), and follow-up simple main effect tests reported in Panel C 
provide further support for my expectations. Specifically, participant responses indicate that 
disclosure location does not affect how influential the disclosure audience is on capital 
allocations when disclosing to capital providers (p = 0.757, two-tailed) but does have an effect 
when disclosing to all stakeholders (p = 0.008, one-tailed). This provides evidence that, when 
disclosing to all stakeholders, the disclosure location appears to help manager-participants 
interpret who their audience is by making specific stakeholder preferences within the disclosure 




Table 5: Reported Influence of Disclosure Audience 
 
Panel A:  Influence of Audience: Mean and (standard deviation) 


















































Audience x Location 33.07 1 33.07 15.97 < 0.001* 
Residual 0.36 2 0.18 0.09 0.917 
Error 175.97 85 2.07   
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel C:  Simple Main Effects 
 df F-stat p-value 
Effect of  location when audience is capital providers 1 0.10 0.757 













6.3 Participant Perception of Location’s Audience and Content 
 I predicted that managers will associate MD&A with financial performance and a larger 
capital provider audience, and a Sustainability Report with social performance and a broader 
stakeholder audience. To provide evidence supporting this prediction, I ask participants two 
questions. The first asks them to indicate the extent to which they believe the report relevant to 
their experimental condition (i.e., MD&A or Sustainability Report) consists of financial 
information or environmental information. Responses are given on an 11-point scale anchored by 
“Entirely financial information” (0) and “Entirely environmental information” (11), with “Equal 
parts financial and environmental information” as the mid-point (5). The untabulated mean 
response to this question in the MD&A (Sustainability Report) condition is significantly lower 
(greater) than the mid-point of the scale (both p’s < 0.001, one-tailed). In addition, the mean 
response in the MD&A condition is significantly lower than the mean response in the 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics, contrast-coded ANOVA, and simple main effects tests for 
participants’ capital allocations. Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which the disclosure 
audience influenced their capital allocations to project A and project B. Responses are made on a 
seven point scale, anchored by “Significantly increased funding to A” (-3) and “Significantly 
increased funding to B” (3), with “Had no effect” (0) as the mid-point. Two participants did not 
provide a response to this question—one participant was in the Capital Providers/MD&A condition 
and the other was in the All Stakeholders/MD&A condition. The four cells in my experiment 
receive the following contrast weights: capital providers/MD&A = -1, capital 
providers/Sustainability Report = -1, all stakeholders/MD&A = -1, all stakeholders/Sustainability 




Sustainability Report condition (p < 0.001, one-tailed). These results are consistent with my 
prediction.  
 The second question asks participants in the MD&A (Sustainability Report) condition 
what proportion of the stakeholders who will likely view the CSR disclosures in the MD&A 
(Sustainability Report) they believe are capital providers vs. other stakeholders. To answer this 
question, participants allocate between 0 and 100% to capital providers and to other 
stakeholders, and the total allocation to each must sum to 100%. The mean percentage of capital 
providers participants believe make up MD&A’s viewership (75.84%) is significantly greater 
than the mean percentage of capital providers making up the Sustainability Report viewership 
(61.77%) (p < 0.001, one-tailed). Taken together, responses to these two questions support my 
predictions that participants are more likely to associate MD&A with financial information and a 
capital provider viewership compared to a Sustainability Report which they are more likely to 
associate with social information and a broader stakeholder audience.  
6.4 Individual CSR Preferences 
Prior research (Agle et al. 1999; Chin et al., 2013) indicates that managers’ individual 
preferences for CSR can influence the level of their engagement in CSR. To increase the power 
of my H1 tests and control for this possibility, I ask participants to answer two questions after 
they make their capital allocation decisions. The first question asks them to indicate how 
strongly they personally believe companies should take measures to reduce their water 
consumption. Similarly, the second question asks them how strongly they personally believe 
companies should engage in socially responsible activities in general. Responses are given on an 
11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating stronger beliefs that 
companies should reduce their water use and engage in CSR. The Cronbach’s alpha for these two 
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measures is 0.92, suggesting the two questions are capturing the same construct. Therefore, I 
average the responses for these two questions to obtain a single measure of participant CSR 
belief. I next run the same contrast-coded ANOVA I used to test H1 but add participants’ 
average CSR belief as a covariate.47 Based on the high mean responses reported in Panel A of 
Table 6, it appears participants generally have strong CSR beliefs. As reported in Panel B of 
Table 6, the effect of individual CSR belief significantly influences participants’ capital 
allocations. Importantly, the contrast-coded interaction of audience and location remains 
significant (p = 0.050, one-tailed), and the simple main effect of location is insignificant when 
the audience is capital providers (p = 0.960, two-tailed) and marginally significant when the  
 
TABLE 6: ANOVA Results with CSR Belief Covariate 
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) Responses for CSR Belief  
Capital Providers / 
MD&A 
Capital Providers / 
Sustainability 
Report 
All Stakeholders / 
MD&A 





n = 22 
7.50 
(2.58) 
n = 23 
8.24 
(1.70) 
n = 21 
7.74 
(2.12) 
n = 25 
 
 
Panel B:  Contrast Coded ANCOVA 
Source S.S. df M.S. F-Statistic p-value 
CSR Belief 2379.93 1 2379.93 3.050 0.042* 
Audience x Location 2164.15 1 2164.15 2.773 0.050* 
Residual 40.16 2 20.08 0.026 0.974 




                                                          
47 Participant CSR preferences do not differ between conditions (p = 0.452, two-tailed, untabulated). 





audience is all stakeholders (p = 0.053, one-tailed). Therefore, I conclude that participants’ 
individual beliefs do influence participants’ capital allocation decisions but that the joint 
influence of disclosure audience and location reported above are incremental to the influence of 







Two of the key features among existing CSR reporting models are which stakeholders 
constitute the disclosure audience and the reporting location of the CSR disclosures. Prior 
research has not yet examined how differences in these features influence managers’ decision-
making and, as a result, stakeholder welfare. Currently, more and more CSR disclosure 
requirements are being made by regulators and stock exchanges, creating a demand for CSR 
disclosure standardization. However, there is currently very little research to inform this 
standardization process. In this study, I seek to inform regulators, standard setters, stakeholders, 
and managers about the consequences of divergent CSR reporting model features by examining 
how managers’ capital allocations are affected by the disclosure audience and location.  
The results of my study suggest that the capital allocations managers make to financial 
and social benefits are sensitive to the CSR disclosure audience and location. Managers, on 
average, allocated more capital to projects that emphasized social benefits when their CSR 
disclosures were directed to a broad stakeholder audience and were provided in a Sustainability 
Report. In all other conditions, they allocated more capital to projects that emphasized financial 
benefits. I find that these differences in capital allocations were driven by how accountable 
managers felt for financial and social performance. I also provide evidence that the influence of 
the disclosure location on managers’ allocations appears to be contingent on whether the 
preferences of the stakeholders in the disclosure audience are homogenous. 
My study is subject to certain limitations. Specifically, I exogenously manipulated 
disclosure audience and location. Although mandatory CSR disclosure is increasing, disclosure 
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audience and location are currently predominantly endogenous choices. As such, my results may 
not generalize to certain endogenous disclosure settings—particularly one where the manager 
making the disclosure decisions is also making the capital allocation decisions. However, there 
are endogenous situations to which my results do likely generalize. One such situation is when, 
the selection of a CSR reporting model is sticky due to switching costs—which it is likely to be, 
at least in the short-run (Graham et al., 2005). As a result, the reporting model is effectively 
exogenous from one period to the next. A second situation is when capital allocations pertaining 
to CSR are made at different levels within a firm. In such situations, even if the CSR reporting 
model is viewed as being endogenous at the firm level, it would likely be exogenous at all lower 
levels. My research design, therefore, allows me to address not only regulatory policy 
implications, but also practical implications of individual firm adoption of a reporting model.  
A second limitation is that I used MBA students as proxies for corporate managers. 
Differences in experience and expertise between my participants and corporate managers may 
affect the results my study. However, I find consistent results using both a traditional (MBA 
students) and non-traditional (Amazon Mechanical Turk workers) participant pool as proxies for 
managers, suggesting that at least initial levels of work experience and business education do not 
significantly alter my results. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that the effects of 
accountability signals on corporate managers may be stronger than indicated in my results. Prior 
research suggests that managers are likely to be high self-monitors (Gibbins and Newton, 1994; 
Kilduff and Day, 1994; Mehra et al., 2001), and individuals who rate high in self-monitoring are 
particularly sensitive to accountability influences (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). Therefore, to the 
extent CSR disclosure audience and location affect managers’ felt accountability, any effects of 
accountability detected in my study using MBA students should theoretically be stronger among 
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real corporate managers. Future research might examine whether differences in work experience 
and differences based on personality traits such as self-monitoring might lead to different capital 
allocation outcomes than those documented in my study. 
A third limitation is that participants in my experiment were paid a flat wage. An 
advantage of this design choice is that it helped me to more cleanly isolate the effect of 
disclosure audience and location on managers’ capital allocations. However, in practice, capital 
allocations that influence financial performance can potentially affect managers’ compensation if 
such allocations help managers meet specific financial benchmarks. On one hand, there is reason 
to believe that such incentive compensation would uniformly increase the level of managers’ 
capital allocations to projects that improve financial performance without eliminating managers’ 
capital allocations to projects that maximize social benefits. On the other hand, I acknowledge 
there may also be scenarios in which incentive compensation interacts with managers’ capital 
allocations. Future research could be useful in examining the extent to which managers’ financial 
incentives affect their CSR decisions.  
One practical implication of this study is that managers’ capital allocations are heavily 
influenced by their perception of the preferences of capital providers. That is, the investment 
decisions by participants in my study seem to be largely driven by their belief that capital 
providers have a strong preference for financial performance over social performance. Therefore, 
to the extent managers would like to feel greater flexibility to allocate capital to projects that 
provide greater social benefits, it appears that managers need a better way of communicating the 
benefits of CSR to firm value, to the extent these benefits exist. Similarly, if capital providers 
want managers to engage in socially beneficial projects, my results suggest they need to 
communicate this better to managers to help them feel licensed to do so. Future research can 
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examine these issues. For instance, integrated reports—which are reports that explain how social 
performance translates into firm value over time—may be a viable option to help managers 
understand and communicate the link between social performance and financial performance. 
This, in turn, may help managers feel more comfortable allocating capital to projects that are 








You are the CEO of XYZ Company, a publicly-traded company. XYZ was founded in 2003 and 
has become a pioneer and a global market leader in devices for the motion interface market that 
detect and track an object’s motion in three-dimensional space. The target markets for these 
devices include electronics applications such as smartphones, tablets, gaming devices, and smart 
TVs. 
 
XYZ recently released the results for its 2013 fiscal year. Those results, as well as the results 
from the two preceding years, are provided in the summarized balance sheet and income 













The positive growth XYZ has experienced over the last three years has been similar to the 
median growth rate among firms in XYZ's industry. That is, in XYZ's industry, some firms have 




APPENDIX B: Experimental Instrument – Capital Providers/MD&A Condition 
 
MANAGERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
As CEO of XYZ, you have responsibility for XYZ’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities. Specifically, you select which CSR activities will be funded and you also make 
funding allocation decisions. This will be your primary task in this study and, importantly, you 
will be asked to explain your decisions. 
 
In addition, you oversee the annual public reporting of XYZ’s corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities. Generally, these disclosures include information about what CSR activities you 
have chosen and the benefits these activities provide. These disclosures, however, typically do 
not indicate how much capital you allocate to CSR activities. 
 
Your CSR disclosures will be directed to the following stakeholder groups: 
 
 Investors – the shareholders of XYZ 
 
 Lenders – financial institutions with whom XYZ has loans and credit lines 
 
 
Your CSR disclosures will be primarily communicated in the firm’s annual report. The annual 
report is prefaced with an introductory letter written by you which includes your name and 
picture. Within the annual report, the CSR activities are disclosed in the Management's 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A). The 
general purposes of MD&A are: 
 
 To provide a narrative explanation of a company's financial statements that enables 
investors to see the company through the eyes of management;  
 
 To enhance the overall financial disclosure and provide the context within which financial 
information should be analyzed; and  
 
 To provide information about the quality of, and potential variability of, a company's 
earnings and cash flow, so that investors can ascertain the likelihood that past performance 








A CSR initiative XYZ is considering is reducing the volume of water used in its processes and 
operations. To understand the available options to accomplish this, XYZ formed a research team 
to examine the issue. The research team identified two specific activities you, as CEO, can 
choose to fund to reduce XYZ’s water use: Activity A and Activity B. These two activities can 
be undertaken either simultaneously or independently. 
 
The research team also calculated the expected benefits Activity A and Activity B will generate 
for XYZ’s bottom line and the environment (via reduced water use). The analysis benchmarks 
these benefits against XYZ's hurdle rate (i.e., the rate of return XYZ typically requires of its 
capital investments) and private annual water reduction target--neither of which are public 
information. In summary: 
  
 Activity A exceeds XYZ's hurdle rate but is below XYZ's annual water reduction target 




*Please evaluate the information above with the understanding that on the following page you 
will be asked to: 
 
 Allocate a fixed amount of capital between Activity A and Activity B. 
 
 Provide an explanation of your allocation decision and its benefits for inclusion in MD&A 








APPENDIX C: Experimental Instrument – All Stakeholders/Sustainability Condition 
 
MANAGERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
As CEO of XYZ, you have responsibility for XYZ’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities. Specifically, you select which CSR activities will be funded and you also make 
funding allocation decisions. This will be your primary task in this study and, importantly, you 
will be asked to explain your decisions. 
 
In addition, you oversee the annual public reporting of XYZ’s corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities. Generally, these disclosures include information about what CSR activities you 
have chosen and the benefits these activities provide. These disclosures, however, typically do 
not indicate how much capital you allocate to CSR activities. 
 
Your CSR disclosures will be directed to the following stakeholder groups: 
 
 Investors – the shareholders of XYZ 
 
 Lenders – financial institutions with whom XYZ has loans and credit lines 
 
 Communities – the local residents of the cities where XYZ operates and is headquartered 
both nationally and internationally 
 
 Governments – the local, regional, and national governments where XYZ operates and is 
headquartered 
 
 Non-governmental organizations –private not-for-profit organizations concerned about 
XYZ’s social and environmental impacts 
 
 Customers – XYZ’s global customer base 
 
 Suppliers – XYZ’s global supply chain 
 
Your CSR disclosures will be primarily communicated in the firm’s Sustainability Report. The 
Sustainability Report is a standalone report that is issued by XYZ annually and is prefaced with 
an introductory letter written by you which includes your name and picture. The general 
purposes of the Sustainability Report are: 
  
 To report the company’s economic, environmental, and social impacts. 
 To present the company’s values and governance model, and demonstrate the link between 
its strategy and its commitment to a sustainable global economy. 
 To help companies measure, understand and communicate their economic, environmental, 








A CSR initiative XYZ is considering is reducing the volume of water used in its processes and 
operations. To understand the available options to accomplish this, XYZ formed a research team 
to examine the issue. The research team identified two specific activities you, as CEO, can 
choose to fund to reduce XYZ’s water use: Activity A and Activity B. These two activities can 
be undertaken either simultaneously or independently. 
 
The research team also calculated the expected benefits Activity A and Activity B will generate 
for XYZ’s bottom line and the environment (via reduced water use). The analysis benchmarks 
these benefits against XYZ's hurdle rate (i.e., the rate of return XYZ typically requires of its 
capital investments) and private annual water reduction target--neither of which are public 
information. In summary: 
  
 Activity A exceeds XYZ's hurdle rate but is below XYZ's annual water reduction target 





*Please evaluate the information above with the understanding that on the following page you 
will be asked to: 
 
  Allocate a fixed amount of capital between Activity A and Activity B. 
 
 Provide an explanation of your allocation decision and its benefits for inclusion in the 
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